SMU Law Review
Volume 57

Issue 1

Article 8

January 2004

Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort
Law
Joseph H. King Jr.

Recommended Citation
Joseph H. King, Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV.
163 (2004)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol57/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

PAIN AND SUFFERING, NONECONOMIC
DAMAGES, AND THE GOALS OF
TORT LAW
Joseph H. King, Jr.*

We have come to accept almost without question the monetary evaluation of the immeasurableperturbationsof the spirit. But why should
the law measure in monetary terms a loss which has no monetary
dimension?1
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I.

INTRODUCTION

HE awarding of damages for the noneconomic effects of pain and
suffering 2 has become an established (and well entrenched) moiety of personal injury tort law. Nevertheless, as one writer (who
apparently supports the practice) has noted, it is "widely perceived as one
of the tort beast's uglier heads."' 3 Over the years there have been occasional calls or proposals to deal with the pain and suffering question.
These have run the gamut from attempts to rationalize the criteria for
those damages, to the imposition of limits on such awards, to occasional
suggestions for the elimination of such damages in some types of torts
claims. I wish to confront the essential question of whether noneconomic
damages for pain and suffering should be retained at all in personal injury
tort law. As an analytical framework, I will use a teleology grounded in
the basal goals of personal injury tort law and discuss whether these damages are justified under those goals. I will argue that pain and suffering
damages cannot be justified in any thoughtful way when one unprepossessedly considers such damages in the context of the goals of tort law.
Pain and suffering damages and the policy goals of modem tort law are
conceptually and operationally incompatible. Therefore, I propose an admittedly elegant solution (with some trepidation lest I be marked as a one
with a "villainous disposition" 4 ): that noneconomic damages for pain and
suffering no longer be recoverable in any personal injury torts claims.
I will begin by offering a brief overview of the evolution of pain and
suffering damages. I will then discuss the recognized goals of personal
injury tort law and explain how I believe that these goals are subverted by
the awarding of noneconomic damages for pain and suffering. And, finally, I will propose the complete elimination of damages for pain and
suffering in personal injury torts cases and suggest (albeit tentatively and
preliminarily) an outline of some compliments that ought to be consid2. The phrase "pain and suffering" is often used broadly to cover a whole range of
noneconomic losses, such a physiological pain, mental anguish and distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and the non-economic effects of disfigurement. See 2 A.L.I. REPORTERS'
STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 199-201 (1991) [hereinafter

REPORTERS' STUDY]. I shall use the phrase, "pain and suffering," in the current article to
signify this broad range of noneconomic effects. I use the phrase to embrace all
noneconomic damages in personal injury torts cases for the sake of simplicity and ease of
expression, since the phrase is almost a universally recognized expression in both the law
and lay settings.
3. Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Painand-suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1789 (1995).
4. William Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 28
(1955) (noting that to quarrel with the awarding of damages for pain and suffering "would
not only contradict a practice long standing, but would also indicate a villainous
disposition").

2004]

GOALS OF TORT LAW

ered along with the elimination of pain and suffering damages. More specifically, I will conclude this article by positing a three-pronged approach
to pain and suffering damages. First, I propose that compensatory damages no longer be awarded in any personal injury tort claims for the
noneconomic consequences of pain and suffering. Second, I will urge
that the scope of economic damages be broadly conceived to assure that
comprehensive medical and rehabilitative strategies are employed to assuage the plaintiff's pain and mental suffering. And finally, I will suggest
that the prevailing plaintiffs in personal injury torts claims be awarded
reasonable attorneys fees.
A mantra in personal injury cases is that damages are supposed "to
return the plaintiff as closely as possible to his or her condition before the
accident," 5 or "make the plaintiff whole."'6 The problem is that damages
for pain and suffering do not accomplish that immediate end-they do7
not and never can return the injured person to his pre-injury position.
The only damages that realistically can be said to contribute to the return
of the plaintiff to his pre-injury state are economic damages that address
loss of earning capacity and medical expenses. Of these economic damages, the only ones that can genuinely nullify some of the pain are economic damages for medical expenses to cover pain management and
rehabilitation, not noneconomic damages for pain and suffering.
It is fitting that the period of emergence for pain and suffering damages
as a central part of the measure of damages in personal injury torts cases 8
roughly coincides with the first publication date of Hans Christian Andersen's classic tale, The Emperor's New Clothes.9 As the story goes, two
swindlers masquerading as weavers declared that they made clothes from
a marvelous and beautiful fabric, one, however, that was invisible to unfit
or unworthy persons. Most everyone, including the emperor, colluded in
their lie, fearful lest they appear unfit or unworthy. Eventually, the emperor made his appearance adorned in his "new clothes" and walked
5. MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 679 (7th ed. 2001); see also McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374
(N.Y. 1989) (stating that the "goal is restore the injured party, to the extent possible, to the
position that would have been occupied had the wrong not occurred"); A. I. Ogus, Damages for Lost Amenities: For a Foot, A Feeling or a Function?, 35 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972)
("Applying the restitutio in integrum principle, the court attempts to put the plaintiff in the
position he would have been in but for the defendant's tort.").
6. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19
OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 160 (1958).
7. See Richard L. Abel, Critique of Torts, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 785, 803 (1990) (stat-

ing that the fundamental justification for torts damages "is hopelessly incoherent-money
cannot restore victims to their status quo before the accident" and that "money is a poor
equivalent for non-pecuniary loss"); Ogus, supra note 5, at 2 ("Restitution in integrum, in
its ordinary sense, is impossible.").
8. See infra Part II.
9. See HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES (1836), reprinted in THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES AND STORIES 77 (Erik Christian Haugaard trans.,
1974). The fairy tales and stories were first published over a period of years, with The
Emperor's New Clothes making it first appearance in 1936. See THE COMPLETE FAIRY
TALES AND STORIES, supra, at 1072.
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under his crimson canopy in a procession for all to admire. 10 Suddenly, a
little child blurted out the truth-the emperor "doesn't have anything
on,"11 sentiments loudly echoed by the crowd. 12 Although "[tlhe emperor shivered, .

.

. certain they were right," he nevertheless decided he

must continue the charade and, we are told, "walked even more
'13
proudly."
For nearly two centuries, the courts and legal community have indulged
similar new clothes on the damages model, an illusion that money can
somehow be made to correspond to the noneconomic effects of pain and
suffering, and can after a fashion be rationally calculated. But, there is no
correspondence, and they cannot be rationally calculated. There is no
basis for this reification of pain and suffering into currency. This emperor
has no clothes, and all the legal fictions in the world cannot change that.
The only question that makes sense, then, is not whether damages for
pain and suffering make the plaintiff whole-they cannot-but whether
such damages are consonant with the underlying policy goals of tort
law. 14 A number of goals of tort law have been recognized over the years.
The paramount contemporary efficiency-based goals of tort law contemplate that the costs of accidents be allocated to the most suitable actors
and enterprises whose activities and products generate them, thereby
spreading the costs of accidents to the consumers of the products and
services.1 5 In so doing, both the enterprises and their consumers are informed through pricing and cost structures of the true and relative costs
of accidents. This allocation operates to spread the losses of individuals to
a broad class of consumers of the enterprise's goods and services, or
through liability insurance to a broad class of participants in the insured
activity. 16 Deterrence-incentive-based goals are premised on the assumption that the threat or potential for liability will inspire safer conduct or
17
more efficient allocation of resources and loss prevention strategies.
The attainment of all of the preceding economic goals hinges on the integrity and soundness of the process of valuing victims' losses. Loss allocation and spreading are undermined by the incommensurability of pain
and money.18 The deterrence-incentive-based goals, whatever their va10. ANDERSEN, supra note 9, reprintedin THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES
80 (Erik Christian Haugaard trans., 1974).

AND STORIES

11. Id. at 81.
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. This matter has received relatively scant attention. See Edward J. McCaffrey et al.,
Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV.
1341, 1343 (1995) (noting lack of exploration in the legal literature "of what 'compensation' in fact even means"). Some of the analysis developed in the following subsections
dealing with the goals of tort law were previously explored in less detail in a prior article
addressing strict tort liability. See Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-OrientedApproach to Strict
Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 342, 382-89 (1996).
15. See infra Part III.C.3.
16. See infra Part III.C.2.
17. See infra Part II.C.4.
18. See infra Part III.B.
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lidity, presumably depend on the presence of some rational foundation
that individuals and enterprises can summon in making their cost-benefit
analyses that optimize the expenditure of resources on loss avoidance.
Deterrence and incentive goals of tort law are corrupted when the assessment of damages is arbitrary and lacks any objective referent.
A measure of damages that prominently includes noneconomic damages for pain and suffering subverts the very goals of tort law that personal injury damages are supposed to promote. Damages doctrine has
thus been allowed to slip from its true analytical moorings and then to
insidiously grow by its unchecked appetitive temper, all the while corroding the policy goals that should animate tort law. This process has been
going on for decades. It is one of those phenomena more universally
described by Leo Tolstoy at the conclusion of War and Peace.19 In what
we might call his nation-ship metaphor, Tolstoy warns that "[i]t is only by
watching closely, moment by moment, the movement of that flow, and
comparing it with the movement of the ship, that we are convinced that
every moment that flowing by of the waves is due to the forward movement of the ship, and that we have been led into error by the fact that we
are ourselves moving too."2 0° And so in early astronomy, "the difficulty
of admitting the motion of the earth lay in the immediate sensation of the
earth's stationariness."'z Likewise, with these damages, the difficulty in
challenging the current practice may rest with our sense of familiaritybased inertia despite the relentless persistence and expansion of these
damages. As with tired astronomy, even though we do not feel firsthand
the movement of the earth, if we assume its immobility we are reduced to
'22
absurdity, but by "admitting its movement, we are led to laws."
II.

EVOLUTION OF PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES

There are three categories of potential damages in tort cases: nominal
damages, 23 compensatory damages, and punitive damages. 24 Compensatory damages are the focus of most torts claims. They consist of both
economic (or pecuniary) damages that include past and future loss of
earning capacity and medical expenses, and damages for the
19. LEO NIKOLAYEVICH TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE (Constance Garnett trans., Modern Lib. 2002) (1865).
20. Id. at 1368.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. According to the Restatement, "[n]ominal damages are a trivial sum of money
awarded to a litigant who has established a cause of action but has not established that he
is entitled to compensatory damages." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 (1979);
see also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 85 (1935)
("Nominal damages are awarded for the infraction of a legal right, where the extent of the
loss is not shown, or where the right is one not dependent upon loss or damage.... [and] is
made as a judicial declaration that the plaintiff's right has been violated.").
24. Punitive damages have no compensatory function, but instead "serve to give outlet, in cases of outrageous conduct, to the indignation of the jurors, and they are defended
as furnishing a needed deterrent to wrong doing, in addition to that furnished by criminal
punishment." MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 275.
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noneconomic consequences of injuries, that is, those based on the
noneconomic effects of victim's pain and suffering (and similar or related
noneconomic affliction). Of course, a victim's pain and suffering may,
and often does, cause economic consequences, such as pain-mediated disability that results in loss of earning capacity or that necessitates medical
care. 25 To the extent that there are economic consequences of the pain
and suffering, these are deemed economic losses and are therefore compensated as economic damages. I would continue to fully compensate
torts victims for these economic consequences of their pain and suffering.
It is the category of noneconomic "pain and suffering" damages 26 that
will be the focus of this article.
Noneconomic consequences of personal injuries include the whole array of mental suffering or other compensable mental responses to a personal injury. The categories and terminology of noneconomic suffering
have varied. I will not attempt to catalogue the disparate terminology
and permutations here. What is important, for present purposes, is that
my observations and recommendations apply to all noneconomic consequences to the victim 27 of a tortious personal injury. Typically,
noneconomic consequences have included the usual pain and suffering
consisting of the "[t]angible physiological pain" 28 and the "unpleasant
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage," 29 along with the "anguish and terror felt in the face of impending injury or death, both before and after the accident. ' 30 Such
damages may also include the noneconomic effects of limitations caused
by the injury, which are often referred to as "the enduring loss of enjoyment of life by the accident victim who is denied the pleasures of normal
personal and social activities because of his permanent physical impair25. See Clarence Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 476, 476

(1959) (noting that "[s]uffering can disable," and that "pecuniary compensation for economic loss resulting from pain should be recoverable").
26. See supra note 2.
27. Compensatory damages may be claimed not only by or on behalf of the immediate
victim of a personal injury, but also by persons sharing certain relationships with the victim
that may entitle them to damages based on the adverse effects of the immediate victim's
injury on those relational interests. These claims may include, for example, loss of consortium and wrongful death claims, the latter of which may in turn include not only economic
damages for loss of pecuniary contributions from or earning of the deceased victim, but in
some states also damages for loss of consortium, companionship, and guidance. See DAN
B. DOBBs,

THE LAW OF TORTS 807-13 (2000). There is a divergence of approaches on

whether these latter wrongful death items should be considered economic or noneconomic
losses. See id. at 812. These relational claims are beyond the scope of this article, although
the analysis may also be pertinent to such claims to the extent that they are considered
economic in nature.
28. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 199-200.

29. International Association for the Study of Pain, IASPO Pain Terminology, Pain
Terms, "Pain," at http://www.iasp-pain.org/terms-pain (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
30. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 199-200; see Overstreet v. Shoney's Inc., 4
S.W.3d 694, 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (describing pain and suffering as encompassing the
mental and emotional responses to pain, and also as including "anguish, distress, fear, humiliation, grief, shame, or worry").
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damages are typically also recoverment. ' '3 1 And, finally, noneconomic
32
able for "disfigurement.

More than forty years ago, Louis Jaffe observed that "the crucial controversy in personal injury torts today is not in the area of liability but of
damages." 3 3a Nevertheless, it is damages law for noneconomic damages
for pain and suffering that most foils and escapes convincing rationalization. Perhaps this is in part because the matter of damages is so preeminently "jury law." '3 4 And with so much wealth and professional
standing3 5 riding on damages issues, the reticence and circumspection of
the legal community when it comes to critical analysis of the professed
justifications for pain and suffering damages may be understandable. The
fact remains, however, that Jaffe's largely unheeded observation is
equally compelling today. And, no aspect of damages law is more controversial than the question of the place of recovery for pain and suffering in
36
modern tort law.

Although precursors3 7 and forerunners of pain and suffering damages
may have been present for centuries,38 the awarding of such damages as
we understand them in torts cases probably began to evolve in English
39
practice about the same time the English courts began to use juries.
31. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 199-200; Dobbs, supra note 27, at 1052.
There is some variation nationally over the number and contours of the categories of
noneconomic damages and whether they should be computed together as a single sum or
as separate items. See JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 388 (1999). Some
cases allow damages to be computed separately for each category of noneconomic harm, or
at least some of the categories. See Boan v. Blackwell, 541 S.E.2d 242, 243 (S.C. 2001)
(holding that "loss of enjoyment of life" and "pain and suffering" were "separately compensable elements of damages"); Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 715-16 (allowing the jury to separately assess each of the three categories of noneconomic damages). Other courts,
however, strongly disagree, and do not allow the jury to make separate awards. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 373, 375-76 (N.Y. 1989) (disallowing the jury to make separate awards for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).
32. Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 715-16. According to Overstreet, disfigurement "impairs a
plaintiff's beauty, symmetry, or appearance." The courts are divided on whether damages
for disfigurement should be assessed as part of the award for pain and suffering or separately. FISCHER, supra note 31, at 391.
33. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 221. This concern by Jaffe was echoed a generation later in
an important article by Professor Ingber. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 856 (1985) (commenting that the torts
process "focuses too much on rules limiting liability and too little on the fundamental issues of damages and remedies generally").
34. Kalven, supra note 6, at 159.
35. Id. at 158 (commenting that the reputation of plaintiffs' lawyers "is measured more
in terms of what they would ... get in a given case than it is in terms of winning or losing").
36. See Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 764-65 (1995) (describing criticism of the noneconomic damages in tort
claims).
37. The Anglo-Saxons may have (even before the Norman Conquest of Britain) employed a system of money compensation (or "bot") for wrongs of violence that was based
on a schedule of payments specified for certain types of injuries. MCCORMICK, supra note
23, at 22. This system constituted a "step in the gradual substitution of judicial redress for
the vengeance of the blood feud." Id.
38. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Keith Carpenter, Payment for Pain and Suffering Through
History, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 411, 412 (1983).
39. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 24.
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Damages for pain and suffering began to be recognized in Anglo-American law in the late 18th century.40 The awarding of pain and suffering
damages probably gained widespread acceptance as a part in the overall

damages package in personal injury cases in Anglo-American practice
during the nineteenth century. 41 Noneconomic (pain and suffering) damages saw a spectacular increase following the Second World War. 42 The
increase has been attributed to general affluence, 4 3 popular awareness of
larger verdicts, 44 and more effective trial techniques to achieve large
awards. 45 The American Trial Lawyers Association is credited with a ma-

jor role in the development and refinement of these trial techniques that
has spurred the growth in damages for pain and suffering. 46 And, apparently these damages have continued to mushroom in size. 47 By some ac-

counts, they currently comprise "perhaps one-half of the total damages
paid out in the important categories of products liability and medical malpractice. '48 Damages for pain and suffering are like vestigial appendages
that once arguably had some minor function, but have since lost any defensible purpose. Yet, these damages have not only mindlessly survived,
but have grotesquely grown in size and now command an ever increasing
share of the host's resources to sustain them.
III.

SUBVERSION OF THE GOALS
A.

FIRST PRINCIPLES

I will argue in this article that the goals of tort law are fundamentally
threatened and undermined by awarding pain and suffering. I further
conclude that if the goals are to be preserved, logic dictates that pain and
suffering damages be eliminated in personal injury torts claims. My argument will thus employ a logic-based analysis, one that I recognize may be
40.
(1972).

JEFFREY O'CONNELL & RITA S. SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING

3

41. See O'Connell & Carpenter, supra note 38, at 412; Ogus, supra note 5, at 4.
42. See O'Connell & Carpenter, supra note 38, at 413.
43. Id. Jaffe has noted that "[o]ur concern about 'security' grows as our stake in it
grows." Jaffe, supra note 1, at 222.
44. See O'Connell & Carpenter, supra note 38, at 413; Jennifer K. Robbennolt &
Christina A. Studebaker, News Media Reporting on Civil Litigation and Its Influence on
Civil Justice Decision Making, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 15 (2003) (noting that "large
monetary damages reported in the media may affect what jurors come to consider as the
appropriate range of recovery in subsequent cases," and that "the large monetary damages
reported in the media may serve as judgmental anchors").
45. O'Connell & Carpenter, supra note 38, at 413. See generally Joseph H. King, Jr.,
Counting Angels and Weighing Anchors: Per Diem Arguments for Noneconomic Personal
Injury Torts Damages, 70 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (discussing the trial technique
of using per diem arguments for assessing damages and the background of pain and suffering damages in general); Neal Feigenson & Meghan A. Dunn, New Visual Technologies in
Court. Directionsfor Research, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 109 (2003) (discussing design and
methods for study of the effects of new visual technologies on legal decision making).
46. See O'CONNELL & SIMON, supra note 40, at 4.
47. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering
Awards: Turning Compensation into "Punishment," 54 S.C. L. REV. 47, 64-68 (2002).
48. McCaffrey et al., supra note 14, at 1347.
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challenged as philosophically incomplete. Thus, one might question why
I stop at the goals listed instead of considering other potential interests.
Accordingly, one might ask whether the goals of tort law, and by extension tort law itself, are worth preserving at all, given the tort system's
costs and inefficiencies and the pressing demands for our limited resources from other interests such as the environment, primary education,
or maternal health, to name a few. And, then, of course, one might further suggest that this analysis is itself incomplete because it does not consider whether other interests, perhaps intergenerational ones, might
militate in favor of a different direction. The problem, of course, is that
soon we would find ourselves on what philosophers like to call a "regress
of reasons."'49 And, that regress of reasons then "threatens to become an
infinite regress, '50 in which we pursue a spiraling process seeking antecedent premises followed by more antecedent premises until we either admit to "infinite regress" or arrive at some set of reasons that are derived
in some other fashion, 51 such as by discovering a set of true "first principles" (a questionable and precarious posture with its overwhelming
"conundra of induction and verification"5 2). I have chosen not to travel
that yellow brick road here and not to seek (probably in vain) to find that
"invisible citizen."'53 Accordingly and admittedly, I will adopt a contextualist posture 54 in which there is room for beliefs to "vary from one context to another, and ...from one field of discourse to another." This

means that I will assume for the purposes of the present article that the
goals (and thus the underlying system of tort law that animates them)
should be preserved for now. Accordingly, I will leave to others (or at
least to another day) further "regress" that leads to questions of the wisdom of the ultimate survival of the tort system in its current embodiment.
B.

DISCONTINUITY OF PAIN AND MONEY

It is sometimes said that one of the aims of damages is "compensation. ' '5 5 But, compensation means simply transferring money in response
49. Kelly L. Ross, The Foundationsof Value: Logical Issues: Justification (Quid Facti),
First Principles,and Socratic Method, at http://www.friesian.com-l.htm (last visited June 23,

2003).
50. Id.; see also Henry Mather, Natural Law and Right Answers, 38 AM. J. JURIs. 297,

310 (1993).
51. For a brief summary of various possible theories of "epistmic justification," in response to the regress problem, see Mather, supra note 50, at 309-310.
52. Ross, supra note 49.
53. H.G. WELLS, THE INVISIBLE MAN (1898), reprinted in THE COMPLETE SCIENCE
FICTION TREASURY OF H.G. WELLS 218 (Auenel 1978) (quoting Kemp dialogue with the

invisible man that "[t]he world has become aware of its invisible citizen. But no one knows
you are here").
54. See Mather, supra note 50, at 312-13.

55. See, e.g.,

PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW

353

(6th ed. 1999) ("Compensation is, by definition, one of the functions of compensation systems."); DOBBS, supra note 27, § 10, at 17; Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis":A
Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 765 (1987)
("Most commentators assume that the system's primary objective is to provide compensation ....").Professor Dobbs states:
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to an actionable event-here a personal injury resulting from conduct
that is deemed tortious or liability-justifying. Compensation is not itself a
goal. Compensation is what we do. It does not tell us why or when we
should do it, or how much we compensate. 56 Similarly, it has become
almost a mantra in tort law that damages are supposed "to return the
plaintiff as closely as possible to his or her condition before the acci-

dent, '5 7 or "make the plaintiff whole."'58 But, again, that construct leaves
unanswered questions. What does it mean in the context of damages that
an injured person is rendered "whole"? How do we define "loss" for the
sake of a damages remedy? As Australian tort theorist Peter Cane notes,
"the legal meaning of 'loss' is not simply a question of proper linguistic
usage but also of policy."'59 If making one whole means to restore the
victim with money to the victim's pre-accident state, then taken literally,
that "make him whole" charge does not logically lead to the inclusion of
pain and suffering in the plaintiff's award of damages. Damages for pain
and suffering do not accomplish that-they do not and cannot ever return
the plaintiff to his pre-accident position. Such damages have no restorative power to return the victim to his pre-accident status or to erase past
pain (which time has perhaps already done). 60 The only damages that
truly can negate some of the plaintiff's pain are economic damages for
Compensation of injured persons is one of the generally accepted aims of
tort law. Payment of compensation to injured persons is desirable. If a person has been wronged by a defendant, it is just that the defendant make
compensation. Compensation is also socially desirable, for otherwise the uncompensated injured persons will represent further costs and problems for
society.
DOBBS, supra note 27, at 17. See generally CANE, supra, at 349-53 (discussing the various
meanings of "compensation").
56. Compensation can be viewed as a means to achieve the goals of tort law:
It is sometimes said that a principal function of tort law is to promote the
compensation of those who have suffered injury .... If by a 'function' of tort
law we mean a beneficial effect of the imposition of tort liability, then it is
accurate enough to say that providing compensation to victims is a function
of tort law.
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 18 (2d ed. 2002).

57. See sources cited supra note 5; see also Ingber, supra note 33, at 775 (noting the
common suggestion that damages "are intended to restore the plaintiff to the position he
occupied prior to the tortious act").
58. Kalven, supra note 6, at 160; Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation
Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 45 (1994) ("The commonly understood goal of tort compensation is to restore the injured to their preaccident condition, to make them whole."); Smith,
supra note 55, at 769 (referring to the "cardinal principle" of compensation as prescribing
that "injured plaintiffs should receive an amount necessary to make them 'whole,' that is,
to restore them to the position they would have occupied but for the defendant's tortious
conduct").
59. CANE, supra note 55, at 353.
60. See id. at 354 (stating that "when all has been done to minimize the pain and
suffering by medical means, any residual pain and suffering cannot be shifted: it remains
with the victim, no matter what compensation is paid to that person by others"). To the
extent that damages do restore the victim, as by providing medical care to treat the underlying medical condition and to manage his pain, and to replace lost earning capacity, damages do restore the victim to his or her pre-accident condition. But, those are not, it must
be emphasized, noneconomic damages for pain and suffering as such, the focus of this
article. Rather, they are classic economic damages.
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medical expenses to cover treatment and pain management and to replace loss of earning capacity, but not noneconomic damages for pain and
61
suffering.
Damages cannot erase the memory of past pain, if it exists, nor can
such damages avert future pain. To the extent that pain was disabling or
necessitating medical care, those losses would then be economic losses
and included within the loss of earning capacity and medical costs recoverable by the plaintiff. But, apart from the economic consequences of
pain, money damages cannot nullify past or future pain. Some writers
have nevertheless attempted to find a restorative dimension in
noneconomic damages for pain and suffering to justify the monetary reification of pain represented by damages. These attempts to at least articulate a restorative role for pain and suffering damages have taken several
tacks. First, some writers have characterized noneconomic damages for
63
pain and suffering as a "solatium" 62 for the victim's injured feelings.
Second, some have viewed noneconomic pain and suffering damages as
providing funds to finance some pleasant activity that may in some illdefined way constitute a substitute that sort of offsets or "makes up" for
the fact that the victim has or may endure some pain. 64 The basic idea
61. See Abel, supra note 7, at 803 (stating that the fundamental justification for torts
damages "is hopelessly incoherent-money cannot restore victims to their status quo
before the accident" and "money is a poor equivalent for non-pecuniary loss").
62. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 224.
63. See Ingber, supra note 33, at 781 ("Compensation may restore the plaintiff's sense
of self-value, and ease his sense of outrage.").
64. See ABRAHAM, supra note 56, at 210; CANE, supra note 55, at 351; FISCHER, supra
note 31, at 383; Ingber, supra note 33, at 784-85; Ogus, supra note 5, at 8, 16 (stating that
"[d]amages for non-pecuniary loss may be justified only to the extent that they might effectively be employed to provide the plaintiff with some measure of consolation," that "[t]he
court ... should not attempt to 'value' happiness," and that though it falls short of restoring to the plaintiff the happiness which he has actually lost, attempts the next best thing by
supplying him with the means to obtain some alternative pleasure"); Richard N. Pearson,
Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 502 (1982) (noting for at least some kinds
of intangible harm, awarding damages for pain and suffering "would improve the plaintiff's
pain to pleasure ratio" and that although "units of pain" do not disappear, they "will be
easier to bear in Bermuda"). Thus, Abraham attempts to make the argument suggesting
that damages may actually redress pain:
[E]ven if the plaintiff's pain and suffering cannot ever be fully compensated
for with money, the plaintiff may be able to use an award to provide activities or enjoyments that substitute for those lost as a result of the injury in
question. For instance, if the plaintiff no longer can play soccer because of
paralysis, he might use the money from an award of general damages to
purchase a satellite dish that will bring televised soccer from around the
world into his home, or the plaintiff might use the award to take up an entirely new hobby.
ABRAHAM, supra note 56, at 210. Fischer also notes that one justification for pain and
suffering damages may be to provide the injured party with
sufficient funds to purchase at least an imperfect substitute, i.e., the purchase
of happiness equal to the pain and suffering the plaintiff has endured as a
result of the tortious conduct. ... [Hje can use the pain and suffering award
to purchase happiness in the future to offset the pain and suffering sustained.
The two accounts can be roughly balanced. When the ability to purchase
happiness is in equilibrium with the pain and suffering sustained, it may be
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here seems to be that noneconomic damages for pain and suffering can
"offset intangible loss by awarding funds to purchase a substitute pleasure."'65 And, finally, some writers have raised the possibility of a host of
complex psychological effects of tort recoveries that may provide a measure of relief to the victim. 66 These rationalizations for pain and suffering
simply substitute a different set of incommensurables. Instead of the
problem of dollars for pain, we now get the "satellite dish" for soccer-less
Saturdays. As Steven Smith observed, "[tihis attempt at commensurability succeeds only if we can reduce the rich complexity of human experience to the procrustean categories of pain and pleasure. '67 Nor does the
answer lie in some vague supposed potential psychological benefit from
an award of damages, an award that cannot be addressed by medical expenses but rather must also include noneconomic damages for pain and
suffering. Damages may be gratifying or pleasing to the plaintiff and the
plaintiff's attorney and may perhaps assuage a sense of being wronged
and even improve the plaintiff's self-confidence, 68 but more money does
not nullify past or future pain. The plaintiff may feel more affluent after
receiving damages, just like he would had he won a lottery. But he will
not feel free of pain. In fact, some commentators have raised the question "whether the award may actually tend to reinforce the plaintiff's
pain."' 69 Others have noted that damages for pain and suffering "dehumanize the response to misfortune, substituting money for compassion,
arousing jealousy 70instead of sympathy, and treating experience and love
as commodities."
More importantly, even conceding some pleasant effects of damages
for pain and suffering on the plaintiff's state of mind, those effects do not
counterbalance the negative effects of the "arbitrary indeterminateness

said that the plaintiff has been "restored" to the position he would have
achieved, absent the tortious conduct. While the restoration is approximate,
it is the best the legal system can do and preferable to the alternative of no
compensation, which may be perceived as a windfall for the defendant.
FISCHER, supra note 31, at 383-84.
65. Morris, supra note 25, at 479 (noting the fact that "image[s] of the law affording
special pocket money to sufferers for books, television sets, and other distractions from
pain is appealing," but rejecting the rationale for unintentional injuries); Shuman, supra
note 58, at 47 (describing without endorsing this thesis).
66. See Shuman, supra note 58, at 51, 56-57, 60-64 (suggesting the possibility that imposition of tort liability for pain and suffering may be perceived as punishing the
tortfeasor, empowering the victim, restoring the victim's sense of equity, providing direction for "therapeutic assessments of blame," enhancing the victim's sense of dignity and
procedural justice, thereby providing psychological relief to the victim); Smith, supra note
55, at 784 (referring to the "psychological need for 'justice"').
67. Smith, supra note 55, at 771; see also 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 398 (2d
ed. 1993) (noting that "it is clear that the price of distractions is not the measure of these
damages").
68. See Jaffe, supra note 1, at 224.
69. 2 DOBBS, supra note 67, at 398 n.102.
70. Abel, supra note 7, at 823.
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of the evaluation. '' 71 How does one even begin to rationally and predictably measure and monetize those anticipated psychological benefits? No
market or market mechanism exists for pain and suffering, 72 and there-

fore there is no objective referent for such damages. 73 There is also a
Catch-22 here. Presumably the more noneconomic benefits we award,
the more psychological benefit will be derived. At what point then have
we awarded enough when more can still, we are told, possibly yield more
psychic benefit?
Jurors must undertake this "monetization" without a standard because
"[t]here is none to give them."'74 They are indefinite and without an intelligible guiding premise 75 or objective standard. 76 As one article noted,
jury "instructions from the court are breathtakingly unhelpful" in achieving greater predictability of noneconomic awards. 77 Essentially, the only
guidance for setting
such damages is that they be fair and reasonable-an
"empty shell."' 78 No "reservoir of experience" 79 accumulates to support a
frame of reference for triers of fact. This abets "innumeracy" 8 0-the inability of most people to comprehend the reality of or difference between
large numbers. 81 Juries are given scant meaningful instructions from the
71. Jaffe, supra note 1,at 224. As one court observed recently, "[g]arden variety pain
and suffering defies a nice standard for calculation." Duarte v. Zachariah, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d
88, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (1977) ("There is no market price
for a scar ... since the damages are not measured by the amount for which one would be
willing to suffer the harm."); PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTrERY 15 (1997)
(commenting that "there is no way of putting any real financial figure [on pain and suffering]-there is no market for these 'losses"'); Ingber, supra note 33, at 778; Frederick S.
Levin, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Measurement "Anomie," 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 303, 308 (1989) ("No market for pain and suffering exists because a
market is composed of willing buyers and sellers and very few persons voluntarily endure
pain and suffering for a price.").
73. See Chase, supra note 36, at 765 ("An inescapable reality of the pain and suffering
conundrum is that tort law requires the monetization of a 'product' for which there is no
market and therefore no market price.").
74. Id.
75. "Juries are left with nothing but their consciences to guide them." Ingber, supra
note 33, at 778; see Zelermyer, supra note 4, at 31 (stating that "the law supplies no instrument for the measurement of pain and suffering ... except for vivifying the elements of
pain and suffering"); Shari S. Diamond et al., JurorJudgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 31314 (1998).
76. See REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2,at 201-02 (stating that "no legal criteria exist
for assessing the degree of harm that has been done and then translating it into a dollar
figure," and that "U]urors are simply told to apply their 'enlightened conscience' in selecting a monetary figure which they consider to be fair"); Jaffe, supra note 1, at 222.
77. Roselle L. Wissler et al., InstructingJurorson General Damages in Personal Injury
Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 712, 736 (2000).
78. Ogus, supra note 5, at 4.
79. James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing Damages for PersonalInjury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 176 (1990).
80. Douglas R. Hofstadter, Metamagical Themas-Number Numbness, or Why Innumeracy May be Just as Dangerous as Illiteracy, Sci. AM., May 1982, at 20.
81. Id.
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courts in assessing pain and suffering damages.8 2 Moreover, perhaps as a
result of the fact-based nature and inherent subjectiveness of the determination, courts have been unable and therefore disinclined to meaningfully
83
supervise jury awards for pain and suffering.
Not only are juries given virtually no useful direction in setting awards
for pain and suffering, but jury decisionmaking is also subject to the influence of extrajudicial factors, such as race, gender, and social and physical
attractiveness.8 4 Commentators have found significant variation in pain
and suffering awards for seemingly similar injuries,8 5 and this so-called
"horizontal inequity, '8 6 cannot be explained or rationalized by the specific facts.8 7 The wide disparity in outcomes also suggests that the
amounts awarded for pain and suffering are arbitrary.88 Not only are
such damages without predictable criteria, but in practice the amount
awarded may be influenced by a host of factors, such as the race, gender,
insurance, or wealth of the defendant, that are extraneous to the actual
89
level of pain of the victim (even if that could be objectively measured).
Pain and suffering damages may reflect efforts to replace sums once received under the rubric of punitive damages by now seeking to utilize
pain and suffering damages as the vehicle for venting a jury's urge to
punish a defendant. 90 At the very least, the sums assessed as damages
82. David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to
Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 256, 313 (1989); Wissler et al., supra note 77, at 713. Jury instructions do not really do much good. The Wissler article notes that "[tihe most noteworthy
feature of current instructions regarding damages is the lack of guidance they provide. The

consequence appears to be awards that have considerable variability and that are influenced by improper considerations." Wissler et al., supra note 77, at 713.
83. Leebron, supra note 82, at 265; see also Blumstein et al., supra note 79, at 175.
84. Levin, supra note 72, at 320 & nn.64-67.
85. Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 775 (1995).
86. Wissler et al., supra note 77, at 713; see Geistfeld, supra note 85, at 784; Leebron,
supra note 82, at 310.
87. Leebron, supra note 82, at 258-59; see also Blumstein et al., supra note 79, at 174;
Wissler et al., supra note 77, at 713. Potential sources of this variation, in addition to the
potential influence of extrajudicial factors, include basic human inconsistency aggravated
by the lack of reference points, events at trial unrelated to the damages assessment, and, of
course, manifold differences from one individual juror to the next. Leebron, supra note 82,
at 314.
88. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 67, at 398-99 (stating that in connection with such damages that "verdicts vary enormously, raising substantial doubts whether the law is evenhanded in the administration of damage awards or whether in fact it merely invites the
administration of biases for or against individual parties"); Geistfeld, supra note 85, at 783
(noting the arbitrariness of pain and suffering "because jurors are unsure how to derive the
award").
89. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law
in Action, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 275, 314 (2001) (stating that "compensatory damages are
valued according to a host of things beyond the harm done to the plaintiff: the size of the
defendant's liability insurance policy, the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct, the
presence or absence of subrogation claims, the plaintiff's need for money, and in some
cases, the amount of the defendant's other assets"); Chase, supra note 36, at 768-70 (noting
that damages may be affected by the race, gender, and wealth of the defendant).
90. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 47, at 49 (stating that "plaintiffs' lawyers ...
have poured new wine of punishment evidence, once used to obtain punitive damages, into
old bottles of pain and suffering awards"). Schwartz and Lorber explain how pain and

20041

GOALS OF TORT LAW

may be a product of the fusion of liability and damages issues. 91 Pain and
suffering are also notoriously easy to feign, and therefore the outcomes
may often reflect various degrees of malingering rather than actual pain.
As one author noted, "science has not yet discovered the magic elixir for
distilling truthfulness from malingering. ' 92 Thus, injured plaintiffs who
apparently experience similar levels of pain have often received vastly
different amounts of damages. 93 Furthermore, the scientific literature
strongly suggests that individual levels of pain perception may be influenced by a host of subjective subject-specific variables. 94 These variables
include, for example, differences in the perceived responsiveness and attentiveness of one's spouse to a person's chronic pain,95 the gender of the
subject,9 6 cultural and ethnic differences, 97 and regular cigarette
98
smoking.

suffering awards are being used as surrogates to replace the lost money that until recently
(before the Supreme Court, state legislatures, and federal income tax laws put the brakes
on or removed some of the wind from the sails), had been recovered as punitive damages.
Id. at 53-59. Pain and suffering damages are being "twisted into a covert punitive damages
substitute . .. [to] provide the next oil well for 'jackpot justice."' Id. at 68 (quoting McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989)).
91. See Edith Greene, Is the Jury Competent?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1989, at 225, 232 (commenting that "jurors may fuse liability and compensatory damages
issues"); Wissler et al., supra note 77, at 725 (stating that "the fusion of liability and damages reflects a discounting of awards for uncertainty about the defendant's liability or a
surcharge to punish for reckless or egregious behavior").
92. Steven I. Friedland, Law, Science and Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 341
(1998) (examining the current methodologies for attempting to detect deceit and malingering in the legal system).
93. Leebron, supra note 82, at 310.
94. See generally Janet L. Abraham, MD & Lois Snyder, JD, Pain Assessment and
Management, 28 PALLIATIVE CARE 269, 270 (2001) (stating that "[p]ain rating scales are
subjective, not objective"); A.J.M. Clark, Chronic Pain-IsAnything New?, 42 CANADIAN

J. ANESTHESIA R57 (1995) ("Due to their inherent subjectivity, pain, suffering, and disability are difficult to prove, disprove, or quantify in a satisfactory fashion."); Corinne
Manetto, Ph.D. & Susan E. McPherson, Ph.D., The Behavioral-CognitiveModel of Pain, 12
CLINICS GERIATRIC MED. 461, 462 (1996) (noting that "[r]ather than a simple sensory
event, the experience of pain is colored by an individual's unique physiology, psychology,
and socio-cultural background," and that "psychosocial factors" may be "better predictors
of pain than the extent of pathophysiologic damage").
95. Rebecca K. Papas et al., Perceived Spouse Responsiveness to Chronic Pain: Three
Empirical Subgroups, 2 J. PAIN 262, 262 (2001) (noting that differences in the perceived
responsiveness and attentiveness of one's spouse to a person's chronic pain may influence
or correlate with pain levels, pain behavior, and dysfunction).
96. See Francis J. Keefe et al., The Relationship of Gender to Pain, Pain Behavior, and
Disability in OsteoarthritisPatients:the Role of Catastrophizing,87 PAIN 325, 326, 330-31
(2000) (noting significant gender differences in pain, pain behavior, and "catastrophizing,"
which is the "tendency to focus on and exaggerate the threat value of painful stimuli and
negatively evaluate one's ability to deal with pain"). See generally Clark, supra note 94, at
R56 (stating that gender "is an important factor in pain," noting the importance of menstrual cyclicity in pointing out rhythmic physiological patterns in pain and that pain also
varies during the day).
97. See Rafael A. Ortega et al., Ethnic Variability in the Treatment of Pain, 26 AM. J.
ANESTHESIOLOGY 429 (1999) ("Culturally and ethnically distinct groups interpret and react to pain differently.").
98. See W. B. Eriksen & D. Brusgaard, Does Smoking Aggravate Musculoskeletal
Pain?, 26 SCANDINAVIAN J. RHEUMATOLOGY 49, 50-52 (1997) (discussing the potential
role of smoking in the pathogenesis of musculoskeletal pain, and noting that "[s]mokers
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The question is not whether important purposes served by tort law,
such as loss spreading and loss allocation, are worthy goals in principle,
but whether the effects of pain and suffering can be monetized and
spread. 99 The insurmountable challenge is to arrive at a rational monetary valuation of pre-accident freedom from the pain that was lost as a
result of the tortious injury. Thus, Jaffe observed that "[t]o put a monetary value on the unpleasant emotional characteristics of experience is to
function without any intelligible guiding premise."' 100 The real problem is
that suffering and money are incommensurable. 101 As Professor Dobbs
has said, such damages "have no restorative purpose, [and therefore]
there is no way to measure the amounts that should be given."'10 2 In fact,
it is "not clear what function they are intended to serve for the plain''
tiff.

10 3

Thus, it is ironic that in a closing argument Melvin Belli himself

once pointed to an "exemplary of a model argument ' 't °4 on pain and suffering involving a wrongful death and survival claim based on an injury to
a seven-year-old electrical-burn victim who lived for two months following his injury.' 0 5 And, indeed, the plaintiff's closing argument eloquently
describes phin. 10 6 But, the undeniable fact remains that money cannot
experienced considerable pain and intense pain more frequently than nonsmokers," particularly in young and middle-aged smokers).
99. Jaffe has stated the issue as "whether placing a money value on this sorrow serves
a sufficiently valuable function to make it a legitimate charge against the national insurance funds." Jaffe, supra note 1, at 231.
100. Id. at 222; see also Kalven, supra note 6, at 161 (characterizing the jury's assessment of damages for pain and suffering as a "gestalt approach"); Schwartz & Lorber, supra
note 47, 59-60 (stating that the law does not provide an effective formula for valuing pain
and suffering).
101. See Botta v. Brunner, 138 A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. 1958) ("There is no exact correspondence between money and physical or mental injury or suffering, and the various factors
involved are not capable of proof in dollars and cents."), modified, N.J. Rule: 1:7-1(b);
Smith, supra note 55, at 770. See generally McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y.
1989) ("Translating human suffering into dollars and cents involves no mathematical
formula; it rests ... on a legal fiction. The figure that emerges is unavoidably distorted by
the translation."); REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 221 (referring to "the nearly unanswerable question of how much money should be paid in redress for an inherently nonmonetary harm"); Margaret J. Radin, Compensation and Commensurability,43 DUKE L.J.
56, 56 (1993) (discussing the tension between concepts of compensation based on a premise
of commensurability of pain and money and one based on the incommensurability of pain
and money).
102. 2 DOBBS, supra note 67, at 398-99; see also FISCHER, supra note 31, at 383 (noting
the criticism of pain and suffering damages based on the fact that "[plain and suffering
cannot be undone"); Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for
Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L.
REV. 333, 341 ("Psychic loss ... is highly idiosyncratic and relatively unmeasurable in

dollars ....
").
103. 2 DOBBS, supra note 67, at 398.
104. 5 MELVIN M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 65.36, at 6 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1984)
(quoting from the closing argument of plaintiff's attorney, Robert J. Glenn).
105. See Del Muro v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 464 N.E.2d 772, 773 (Il1. App. Ct.
1984).
106. The argument included the following language:
Pain is a four letter word. You hear about people praying for death, but you
never hear anybody praying for pain. Pain is something we don't want to
think about. It's horrible. It's the window to hell, and that's exactly what
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erase that pain. In fact, death already has done so. What loss is compensated here? No one is "made whole." Except for medical treatment, pain
and suffering are not reversible by money, nor is the victim's pre-accident
status amenable to restoration by money. Suffering has no monetary analogue nor does it admit of intelligible criteria to guide jurors in transmuting it into a damages figure. Therefore, expecting an objective
appraisal defies logic.
The process of assessing noneconomic damages for pain and suffering
also assumes a degree of separateness of evaluator and object that is unrealistic. In 1926, Werner Heisenber identified what has come to be
known10 7 as the "Uncertainty Principle." 10 8 Heisenberg postulated that
the velocity and present position of an object could not be measured
without shining light on the particle, but the energy of the light disturbs
the velocity. 10 9 Thus, the more accurately one tries to measure the position of something, the less accurately one can measure its speed because
the process of the analysis will affect the result.110 The Heisenberg principle has (not unexpectedly) been mined for deeper meanings that transcend the world of quantum physics. Thus, Professor Tribe finds two
premises underlying Heisenberg's thesis. First, "that any observation
necessarily requires intervention into the system being studied; and second, that we can never be certain that the intervention did not itself
change the system in some unknown way." '' Now, we have to be careful
here leaping at the latest scientific revelation or insight in search of
deeper meaning lest we end up like the Eastern priests, satirized by Pope,
giddy from running in circles trying to imitate the sun.1 12 That said, the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle may hold implications for the question
of pain and suffering damages. Without a monetary analogue for pain,
nor a meaningful objective basis for its appraisal, the separateness of the
evaluator and the evaluated becomes illusory. Jurors project a host of
this little boy went through for two months in that hospital with all that treatment, with all those surgeries in the Burn Care ....
5 BELLI, supra note 104, § 65.36, at 6 (quoting from the closing argument of plaintiff's
attorney, Robert J. Glenn).
107. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle has become a popular allusion even in law review writing, particularly in the context of jurisprudence and statutory and constitutional
analysis. See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishmentas a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 909
(1982); Lawrence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1989); Daniel S. Goldberg, Comment, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: How Classical Scientific Fallacies Undermine
the Validity of Textualism and Originalism, 39 Hous. L. REV. 463, 479-81 (2002).
108. STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 56 (10th ed. 1996).
109. Id. at 56-57.
110. Id. at 57.
111. Tribe, supra note 107, at 18.
112. Recall Pope's lines:
Go, wondrous creature! mount where science guides,
Go, measure earth, weigh air, and state the tides ....
As Eastern priests in giddy circles run,
And turn their heads to imitate the sun.
ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON MAN, THE OXFORD AUTHORS,

(Pat Rogers ed., 1993).

ALEXANDER POPE

281

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

extraneous, even arbitrary, factors into their appraisal of pain. And, victims (to the extent they are the ones who ultimately receive the payout)
will also be affected by the process and prospects of new money. 113 Professor Jack Greenberg, invoked the Heisenberg principle in his discussion
of the death penalty, reasoning that just as "the act of observing may
distort the phenomenon under observation,"'1 14 so too does review of
capital sentencing "so affect[ ] the system that it cannot accomplish its
purpose. ' 115 The solution, according to Greenberg, is a complete revision
of our politic-legal system (hardly likely) or the abolition of capital punishment. I believe we are faced with the same dilemma with pain and
suffering damages and the only solution is their abolition.
Should damages, then, be awarded for pain and suffering at all? For
the answer to that question, I submit that we should turn more saliently
to the underlying goals of tort law for the answer. In the discussion that
follows, I shall undertake to apply a goals-based analysis of the wisdom of
pain and suffering damages. I shall conclude that since money damages
for noneconomic loss associated with pain and suffering have no restorative function-they do no eliminate pain-and since the "loss" represented by pain is not amenable to thoughtful or predictable calculation,
such damages do not promote in any non-chaotic way the goals of tort
law. Noneconomic damages for pain and suffering do just the opposite-they undermine the core modern goals of loss spreading, allocating
losses to other more suitable loss bearers than the plaintiff, and deterring
tortious (or encouraging non-tortious) conduct.
C.
1.

THE GOALS

Preservation of the Peace and Retribution

Historically, affording victims a tort remedy was thought to help preserve the peace by eliminating some of the impetus for victims to seek
revenge or self-help by violent means.1 1 6 In the 16th century, Francis Bacon wrote: "Revenge is a kind of wild justice, which the more man's nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out; for as for the first wrong,
it doth but offend the law, but the revenge of that wrong, putteth the law
113. Tribe's observation, in another context, is apt. "The law," he says, is "not simply a
backdrop against which the action may be viewed," it is itself "an integral part of that
action." Tribe, supra note 107, at 20.
114. Greenberg, supra note 107, at 909.
115. Id.

116. See DOBBS, supra note 27, § 8, at 12 (stating that in medieval England, tort law had
as a principal aim "discouraging violence and revenge"); Ingber, supra note 33, at 787;
Shuman, supra note 58, at 40 ("Modern tort law is rooted in the legal system's search for
an alternative to the blood feud"); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the
History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1970) (identifying the blood

feud, a characteristic of a "barbaric society organized along the lines of blood kinship" and
clans, as the "primordial seed" from which tort law's system of compensation was to
germinate).
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out of office." ' 1 7 In keeping with this idea, pain and suffering damages
"were justified at early common law as vindication for violent conduct...
[where their] purpose was not so much to compensate for economic loss,
' 18
but to forestall vengeance and retaliation." "
There is serious doubts about the continuing validity of this goal in
modern tort law. First, there is not even theoretical validity for the preservation-of-the-peace goal in the case of unintentional injuries, where
there is obviously less of even a theoretical need to discourage retaliation. 119 And, of course, unintentional injuries occupy the vast majority of
the cases that comprise the personal injury landscape, especially where
there are real assets or insurance with which to satisfy judgments for the
victims. Second, society in general is less dependent on violent self-help
as a means of responding to injuries. And, finally, the peace-keeping
function of tort law, whatever its historical underpinnings, is overshadowed by the paramount modern economic-based redistributive goals
such as loss-spreading 120 and loss allocation. 121 Justice Traynor noted
that damages for pain and suffering "originated under primitive law as a
means of punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those who
had been wronged. They become increasingly anomalous as emphasis
shifts in a mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to orderly distribution of losses through insurance and the price of goods. ' a2 2 Thus, P.S.
Atiyah, formerly professor of law at Oxford, comments that "[t]his desire
for vengeance may or may not be a good thing, but it is misdirected when
it leads to demands for more compensation in more cases. ' 123 Although
vestiges of the impulse of revenge may still be found in tort law, 124 such
impulses seem inconsonant with modem redistributive goals today. Occasionally, some writers almost nostalgically bemoan the fact that the
transformation of the tort system has occurred "without adequate consideration of the role of the tort system as an alternative means for injured
parties to satisfy their primal needs. '1 25 This all unfortunately leaves unanswered the unanswerable question of where one is to find a defensible
117.

FRANCIS BACON, OF REVENGE, IN ESSAYS,

reprinted in THE

WORKS OF FRANCIS

BACON 14 (1932).
118. See O'Connell & Carpenter, supra note 38, at 417; Malone, supra note 116, at 1-3.
119. See O'Connell & Carpenter, supra note 38, at 417 ("[Ajlthough damages for ...
pain and suffering gained recognition under the negligence action, the underpinning of
nonpecuniary damages seems less appropriate when applied to inadvertently inflicted
injuries.").
120. See infra Part III.C.2.
121. See infra Part III.C.3.
122. Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
123. ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 161; see also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of
Negligence, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 855, 869 (1953) ("A maturing society will have to replace
this fault formula by one less burdened with pseudo-moral considerations and more responsive to present needs, however devoid the new formula should prove of emotional
satisfaction.").
124. Thus, in advocating a rule of strict tort liability, Ehrenzweig suggests that "this
barbaric system of revenge, in its more refined form of retaliation ... lies at the root of our
fault rule." Ehrenzweig, supra note 123, at 866.
125. Shuman, supra note 58, at 41.
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and discernible test for determining to what extent torts damages should
be augmented to satisfy those "primal needs."
2.

Loss Spreading

By requiring enterprises and insured actors to pay for the losses their
activities and products tortiously cause, and to reflect those costs in the
prices charged, losses are "spread" to a wider class of market participants
beyond the immediate victims. Loss spreading thus is thought to ameliorate the harsh impact of injuries on individual victims by preventing their
confluence on a few victims, and may also reflect notions of the declining
marginal utility of money. 126 This is achieved by diffusing (or "spreading" or "distributing") the losses that would otherwise be borne by the
victim into the costs of the services and goods generated by the injurious
activities-in effect having damages be incorporated into the costs of
those engaging in the injurious activities. Redressing economic losses for
loss of earning capacity and past and future medical expenses largely prevents the concentration of the economic burden of accidents on individual victims. But, awards for the adverse noneconomic effects of tortious
conduct, such as pain and suffering, do not similarly facilitate this end. In
fact, imposing damages for noneconomic losses for pain and suffering
may exhaust limited resources that would otherwise be available for redressing economic losses. In so doing, payment of noneconomic damages
may thereby actually thwart the paramount loss-spreading goal of restoring to the plaintiff the loss of money due to impairment of the victim's
earning capacity and necessitated by past and future medical expenses.
The ultimate goal of loss spreading, as animated by the more immediate goal of achieving "rectification" 1127 logically would seem to depend
on a commodified-commensuarable idea of compensation, where theoretically "the victim is by definition indifferent between having been injured and having money, on the one hand, and not having been injured
but not having money, on the other.' 28 In other words, loss spreading
seems premised on damages that create a "state of affairs after the injury
and compensation (having been injured and having the money) is identical with ...

the status quo ante (not having been injured but not having

126. See DOBBS, supra note 27, at 17-18 ("In this view, each individual purchaser of the
products will pay a tiny fraction of the costs of injuries inflicted by those products and the
injured person will not be compelled to bear the entire cost alone. Loss would thus cause
less social dislocation."); David A. Fischer & Robert H. Jerry, Teaching Torts Without Insurance: A Second-Best Solution, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 857, 869 (2001); Fleming James, Jr.,
Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REV. 293, 294 (1958) (articulat-

ing the rationale for loss spreading in terms of the declining marginal utility of money and
its added relative importance to a victim as the victim has less of it); King, supra note 14, at
350-52, 383-84; Michael J. Trebilcock, The Future of Tort Law: Mapping the Contours of the
Debate, 15 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 471, 471-80 (1989) (describing loss-spreading as meaning
that the costs of accidents are "collectively, not individually, borne").
127. Radin, supra note 101, at 60-61.
128. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 55, at 770 ("[T]he notion of calculating damages for
intangible injuries inevitably suggests that mangled limbs and deceased spouses or children
can be treated as a [sic] commodities subject to purchase, sale, or bargain.").
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money."' 12 9 But, that is impossible because damages and pain are qualitatively incommensurable, and because damages cannot alleviate or eradicate past, present or future pain and suffering. Thus, as Jaffe says, "it is
doubtful that the pooled social fund of savings should be charged with
sums of indeterminate amount when compensation performs no specific
economic function.' 130 There is in short "no obvious way to translate an
intangible, nonmonetary injury into a monetary award. Moreover, there
is no objective test that measures the severity of the victim's pain and
1 31
suffering injury."'
The illogic of trying to fit compensation for pain and suffering within
the goal of loss spreading is also apparent for other reasons. There is
serious doubt whether accident victims, prior to accidents, even hold an
expectation of compensation for pain and suffering.1 32 Some have argued that tort law can be viewed as a sort of surrogate for a mechanism of
133
mandatory insurance against at least some kinds of accidental losses.
129. Radin, supra note 101, at 60-61.
130. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 225. Radin describes Jaffe's language as identifying the
"twin earmarks of incommensurability-'indeterminacy' and 'no specific economic function."' Radin, supra note 101, at 75.
131. Geistfeld, supra note 85, at 781.
132. O'CONNELL & SIMON, supra note 40, at 3. O'Connell and Simon conducted a
survey of persons who had received liability insurance payments for auto accident. Id. at
14. Their conclusions included the following:
The most overwhelming impression from the findings is the large-scale confusion in the minds of accident victims about the concept of pain and suffering. Overwhelmingly, they did not know about payment for pain and
suffering at the time of the accident; most victims learned about it during the
settlement process; many were mistaken about whether they were paid for it;
and, whether they were paid for pain and suffering-or whether they thought
they were paid for it-made little or no difference in their attitudes toward
the pain they suffered, toward having had the accident, or toward the other
driver....
Perhaps the most striking finding of our study is how little, prior to the any
accident, traffic victims understood or expected payment for pain and
suffering....
Startling too are our findings of what little difference being paid for pain and
suffering apparently makes to traffic victims. For example, very few victims,
it will be recalled, ended up resenting the other driver with whom he collided, and whether one was paid-or how much one was paid-for pain and
suffering had no significant relationship in assuaging any feelings of
resentment....
[O]n the basis of our findings, it would appear that auto victims do not feel
"a sense of continuing outrage," nor do damages for pain and suffering "wipe
out" any sense of outrage.
Id. at 19, 43-44, 46, 48.
133. See REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 206 (identifying as one of the goals of
torts a form of mandatory disability insurance); Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 1896914 (extolling the role of tort liability as a mechanism for a virtual mandatory insurance);
Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE
L.J. 353, 362-67, 408-11 (1988); Fischer & Jerry, supra note 126, at 870. Croley and Hanson
challenge the dominant view that the awarding of pain and suffering damages are incompatible with the insurance preferences of consumers, stating that "[clonsumers, in effect,
purchase along with their products an insurance policy against nonpecuniary losses that is
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But, the mandatory-insurance notion has been challenged in the context
of noneconomic damages for pain and suffering, where most scholars
have concluded that consumers do not demand insurance against
noneconomic harms from accidents. 134 Schwartz is somewhat more
guarded, noting that it is difficult to say as a general proposition that people will insure against noneconomic harm from pain and suffering. 135 In
the end, however, faced with the question of on which side to err,
Schwartz leans toward the conclusion that people would want to buy no
(or only "slight") coverage for noneconomic harms.' 36 Steven Shavell
reasons that the amount of insurance coverage against noneconomic loss
that a person will wish to purchase "will clearly depend on whether such
losses will affect the utility he would derive from receiving additional
money,"'1 37 and that in many instances, "suffering a nonpecuniary loss
will not alter an individual's need for money or ...the utility he would

derive from receiving additional money."'1 3 8 The idea of tort liability as a
form of mandatory insurance has been roundly criticized with respect to
noneconomic damages for pain and suffering. 39 The reason damages for
specially tailored for whatever loss they may incur." Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at
1898-99. The authors argue that the absence of an insurance market for insurance against
future pain and suffering should not be equated with consumer preference. Instead, the
authors point to a variety of "nonmarket forces" including juries in personal injury cases,
consumer groups, and everyday experience. Id. at 1837-45. The authors' terse arguments
are conclusory. More important, they are circular. In effect, they argue that we need tort
recovery for pain and suffering because we have tort recovery for pain and suffering
(which suggests that consumers would desire insurance for pain and suffering).
134. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 230 (1987) (observing

that coverage for first party insurance against personal injury "usually approximates only
direct medical expenses and foregone earnings"); Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 1790
& n.19, 1797-804; O'Connell, supra note 102, at 366 (stating that no insurance companies
offer first party insurance for future pain and suffering, probably because there is no market for them, and that insurers are "understandably very chary of insuring against adverse
results very much within the control of the purchaser (the insured), and perhaps relatively
unimportant to the purchaser"); George L. Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1546-47, 1553 (1987). Croley and Hanson have stated:
The prevailing wisdom concerning consumer demand for insurance can be
neatly summarized: consumers want full insurance for positively wealth-impacting accidents; they want no insurance for wealth-neutral accidents; and
they want some form of 'disinsurance'-that is, some mechanism by which
they can move money out of the accident state of the world and into the
nonaccident state of the world-for negatively wealth-impacting accidents.
Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 1799-800.
135. Schwartz, supra note 133, at 364. He notes that one should not infer too much
about consumer preferences from the fact that people do not routinely purchase such insurance because that might simply reflect supply-side difficulties facing insurers. Id. at 365.
136. He bases his decision on intuition, the fact that spending money is not a common
response to grief, and the fact that insurers would have to charge high premiums because
of the amorphousness of suffering claims. Id. at 366.
137. SHAVELL, supra note 134, at 229; see also Schwartz, supra note 133, at 362 (saying
that a consumer will choose insurance "that maximizes his expected utility").
138. SHAVELL, supra note 134, at 228.
139. See REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 206 (1991) ("When tort doctrine is pictured in this way-as a port of entry into an insurance program paid for and provided by
members of the community for themselves-the claim of pain and suffering to any, let
alone full, compensation appears shaky."); Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 1790 & n.19
(noting the criticism, but differing with it).
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pain and suffering do not fit with the mandatory-insurance view of tort
law has been explained as follows:
If the injury is temporary, the actual pain will be over long before the
money is collected. If the injury is permanent, the eventual payment
of money will not directly undo the ongoing harm from the loss of a
limb, for example ... All that the tort/insurance system can do is
reduce the money victims have available to spend before they are
hurt in order to give them more money to spend after they are hurt,
though we have no reason to suppose that in their injured state they
would actually enjoy the money any more then they would while
they were healthy.... Consequently, to the extent that tort law functions and is defended as an implicit mode of disability insurance, the
should be deleted as an
logical conclusion is that pain and suffering
140
unwarranted feature of this coverage.
To summarize, loss spreading today is a core goal, probably the paramount goal, of the tort system. It depends on a rational system by which
to value losses. Pain and suffering cannot logically be monetized or commodified into noneconomic damages, tends to be influenced by a wide
variety of subject-specific and extrajudicial factors, and lacks meaningful
criteria for assessment of damages or guidance of juries, all with the inevitable result that such damages are highly variable, unpredictable, and abjectly arbitrary.
3.

Loss Allocation

Tort law, in imposing liability, seeks as a goal to allocate losses to defendants who represent suitable entry points for spreading losses and signaling to consumers that compensating such injuries are costs of the
activity to be reflected in the prices charged. 14 1 Professor Conrad explains, "[e]nterprises are conduits for the transmission of resources to
injury victims from investors, consumers, workers, and other constitu140. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 207 (noting also the paucity of private insurance coverage for first-party loss for pain and suffering).
141. Under this goal tort law can be pictured as a sort of "port of entry" into a de facto
"insurance program, paid for and provided by members of the community for themselves."
Id. at 206; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 56, at 16-18 (noting that through pricing of products or services or the value of widely-owned companies the costs of losses are "distributed
through the defendant to a larger number of individuals"); CANE, supra note 55, at 356-57;
DoBBs, supra note 27, at 17-18 (stating that "[i]n this view, each individual purchaser of the
products will pay a tiny fraction of the costs of injuries inflicted by those products and the
injured person will not be compelled to bear the entire cost alone," that "[f]oss would
cause less social dislocation," and noting the theory that some defendants are seen as good
"risk distributors" who should be held liable "for any harms they cause regardless of fault
because they can 'distribute' the costs of paying compensation" and that "[a]t the same
time, an enterprise would be forced to internalize losses typically generated by the business
itself"); King, supra note 14, at 350-52, 356-58; George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundationsof Modern Tort Law, 14 J.
LEG. STUD. 461, 481 (1985) (tracing the modern intellectual history of enterprise liability
and the premise that enterprises should be held liable in order to internalize the costs of
the accidents they cause).
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The aim is to "internalize" the costs of accidents, thereby achiev-

ing a rational distribution of losses and optimal allocation of resources.
The effectiveness of charging losses to the activities and enterprise that
engender them depends on the method of defining and assessing losses to
be charged to defendants. While economic losses are readily ascertainable, can be compensated in kind,'1 43 and can be evaluated and predicted
by discernible objective criteria, the same cannot be said for
noneconomic losses like pain and suffering damages, which vary for similar injuries. In as much as economic losses are alone amenable to reparation by damages, they are appropriately allocated initially to the activities
and enterprises that caused them. Liability-mediated increases in the
costs of goods, services, and insured activities also represent appropriate
signals to potential consumers of the true costs of such goods, services,
and activities. Contrariwise, awarding damages for noneconomic pain
and suffering, with all their unpredictability and incalculableness, seriously distorts and destabilizes the process of loss allocation,'144 and at the
same time reduces the amount of resources available to enterprises to pay
for economic losses and to function in a free enterprise system. Limiting
damages to economic losses is not only consistent with, but critical to, the
loss-allocation function of tort law.
Another aspect of pain and suffering damages that undercuts the lossallocative goal stems from the simple fact that such damages do not really
have any effect on the pain. Thus, unlike economic damages, pain and
suffering damages do not eliminate pain. The unsuitability of pain and
suffering damages as a vehicle for loss allocation has been aptly described
by Professor Ingber, who comments: "To the extent that intangible injuries are truly nontransferable, imposing liability burdens the defendant
with the costs of an injury that the plaintiff nevertheless must bear. There
is essentially a 'double accounting' in such cases that may present a danger of excessive avoidance and a concomitant misallocation of resources."' 45 Furthermore, the variability of pain and suffering damages
creates perverse incentives for fraud and corruption. Thus, "since awards
for pain and suffering are often roughly calculated as a multiple of medical expenses, the incentive to incur unnecessary medical expenses ...

is

142. Alfred F. Conrad, Who Pays in the End for Injury Compensation? Reflections on
Wealth Transfer from the Innocent, 30 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 283, 287 (1999). "The tort system is sometimes credited with allocating resources away from zones of activity that are

more injurious to other zones that are less so." Id. at 303.
143. "An economic loss can be compensated in kind by an economic gain; but recovery
for noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life rests on
'the legal fiction that money damages can compensate for a victim's injury."'
McDoughald, 536 N.E.2d at 374-75 (quoting Howard v. Lechen, 366 N.E.2d 64, 65 (N.Y.
1977)).
144. Stanley Ingber has observed that damages for intangible injuries may "compound
the aggregate societal injury by increasing the costs of certain activities without correspondingly reducing the impact of the plaintiff's personal injury." Ingber, supra note 33, at
772.
145. Id. at 799-800.
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rampant."1 46
4.

Deterrence and Incentives for Accident Avoidance
Another commonly stated goal of tort liability is to deter unreasonably
47

dangerous conduct or create incentives for safer conduct or activities.'

It has even been said that this goal "delineates tort law."' 148 Even though
noneconomic pain and suffering are not amenable to objective monetization, this goal has nevertheless been invoked as justification of
49
noneconomic pain and suffering damages.'
The deterrence-incentive justification for pain and suffering damages is

unconvincing for a number of reasons. First, there is a disjunction between those who actually pay for tort liability and those who actually

engaged in the tortious conduct. 150 A number of factors contribute to
this situation. Although individuals may be theoretically subject to liability, when they are employed, the actual payment of substantial damages
will usually come from employer-enterprises through vicarious liability.15 1 Proponents of the deterrence goal tend to ignore the reality of
vicarious liability and, in so doing, indulge, as Jaffe says, "a subtly anthropomorphic version of the employer.' 52 There is often liability insurance
that protects individuals even when their tortious conduct does not occur
within the scope of an employment relationship. 153 And, frequently the
146. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice Claims
Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373, 376 (2002);
O'Connell, supra note 102, at 367 (saying that the prospects of pain and suffering encourages wasteful behavior by causing claimants to run up their medical expenses to buttress
their pain and suffering claims and by inviting fraud).
147. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 56, at 206; Conrad, supra note 142, at 294-95;
DOBBS, supra note 27, § 11, at 19; MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 1.04,
at 8 (2003); Abel, supra note 7, at 808 ("At least since Learned Hand offered his famous
formula . . ., judges lawyers, and legal scholars have argued that fear of liability will compel
potential tortfeasors to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, taking just those safety precautions that cost less than the accidents they prevent."); Daniel Shuman, The Psychology of
Deterrence in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 118, 131 (1993).
148. Shuman, supra note 147, at 115; see also CANE, supra note 55, at 361 (referring to
deterrence as "[o]ne of the most important of the suggested functions of personal injuries
compensation law").
149. See Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987). The court commented that if pain and suffering damages were not recoverable, "the cost of negligence
would be less to the tortfeasors and there would be more negligence, more accidents, more
pain and suffering, and hence higher social costs." Id. Of course, in the very next sentence
Judge Posner proceeds to cut the pain and suffering damages in half with a conclusory
statement that it was his duty "to keep these awards within reason," whatever that means.
Id. at 197-98.
150. See Conrad, supra note 142, at 284. "Very few of the actual contributors are the
ones whom the law holds liable." Most payments are made by "enterprises." Id. Only a
small fraction of cases are "individual perpetrators of wrongful harms ... the ultimate
contributors of compensation." Id. at 286.
151. Shuman, supra note 58, at 41 (noting the shift away from actual "individual injurer
responsibility" by liability insurance and vicarious liability).
152. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 230.
153. See ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 163, 167 (stating that liability insurance undermines
deterrence and that there is no effective experience rating of premiums); Conrad, supra
note 142, at 286, 295-96.
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limits of the tortfeasor's liability insurance will coincide with the actual
payout in cases involving the liability of individuals unconnected to an
enterprise "deep pocket." 54 Moreover, tort liability is characterized by
long latency periods and delays between the tortious conduct and the imposition of liability and the actual extraction of payment. 155 Also, for
some the deterrent "force of liability is 1close
to zero because they do not
56
have enough assets to be worth suing."
Second, there are good reasons to doubt the effectiveness of the supposed deterrent effect of tort liability generally. Most torts claims are
157
settled, and when cases are tried the verdicts remain uncommunicated.
Even when the outcomes of trial court and appellate cases are reported,
158
they may not be representative of the larger universe of all claims.
Moreover, a good deal of the behavior subject to the torts system is often
impulsive rather than deliberative.1 59 Errors are also often the results of
cognitive deficiencies in processing information, as Professor Daniel Shuman has pointed out:
[The] examination of the psychology of deterrence in tort law lends
support to those who argue that the current fault-based tort system
does not serve the function of deterrence well. The organic and biological theories reveal the limited capacity of tort law to deter unsafe
behavior. The psychodynamic psychological theories prove too
much and threaten to weaken deterrence by excusing responsibility
154.

See Baker, supra note 89, at 284, 314. Based on a survey of personal injury attor-

neys, the author concludes that there is a norm that "blood money" (referring to the term
used by practicing personal injury attorneys to describe "money paid directly to the plaintiffs by defendants out of their own pockets") is seldom collected as a part of personal
injury settlements against individual defendants personally. Id. at 276, 281. He explains:
[T]here is a norm among tort practitioners that tort litigation is supposed to
be primarily about collecting insurance money, not blood money. .

.

. The

liability insurance norm means that, except for institutional defendants or an
outrageous wrong, liability insurance has become a prerequisite for tort liability. It also means that liability insurance limits function as a cap on tort
damages and that tort claims are shaped to match the available insurance
coverage, with the active participation of both the plaintiff's and the defendant's lawyers.
Id. at 314. This, in turn, has meant that for practicing personal injury lawyers, "it seems that
tort law in action is less concerned with deterrence than tort doctrine and theory would
suggest." Id. at 316. Baker offers a number of possible explanations for the unwritten but
firmly entrenched convention that plaintiffs' attorneys in lawsuits against individuals "usually prefer not to go after blood money." Id. at 284. These include a sense that taking
blood money is morally suspect, practical problems "in collecting real money from real
people," the fact that collecting from an individual defendant out of his pocket "requires
going to trial," the belief that some plaintiffs may like to demand insurance limits in hope
that defendants' insurance carriers will refuse to settle within limits thereby setting up a
potential claim by the insured for excess liability, and a sense that sometimes plaintiffs
have available easier targets, such as underinsured motorist coverage. Id. at 286, 289, 290,
292-93.
155. ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 167 (noting that often the individuals whose conduct
was actually responsible for the harm are long gone).
156. Conrad, supra note 142, at 295.
157. Shuman, supra note 147, at 126.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 127-28; cf. 2 DoBBs, supra note 67, at 398 (commenting that deterrent effects
hardly support these damages when the injury is unintentional).
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for much behavior that is now viewed as tortious. Cognitive psychology reveals that human decisionmaking is systemically flawed, and
that faulty information processing is the norm. Thus, the risk of tort
sanctions is not likely to induce safer behavior in appropriate
cases ....
The behaviorists' insights suggests that the tort system's
use of delayed punishment rather than immediate positive reinforcement is not an effective means of shaping desirable behavior. Social
learning theory holds potential, but unless better communication of
tort law occurs and the percentage of meritorious tort cases brought
is increased so that tort sanctions are observable with greater regularity in the case of tortious behavior, this theory suggests that the
tort system [by demonstrating unpunished transgressions] is likely to
increase rather than decrease the frequency of undesirable behavior.
Thus, the collective wisdom from these theories of human behavior
leads to the conclusion that tort law relying on monetary1 sanctions
is
60
not likely to be successful in deterring unsafe behavior.
More specifically, Shuman finds that the deterrent assumptions of tort
law diverge from the behaviorist theory of human behavior in several
ways. Behavioral theory depends on celerity and reinforcement of the
tort system's response to injurious conduct, but "because of the absence
of celerity in tort sanctions-there is little reason to expect tort law to
result in safer behavior.' 16' Also, "the intermittent nature of the of the
tort sanctions for tortious behavior is likely to render it less effective in
achieving safer behavior. 1 62 And finally, the torts system seeks to influence behavior coercively through the threat of liability, whereas behavioral theory suggests that positive rewards are more effective than the
threat of punishment in guiding behavior.' 63 Similarly, the cognitive psychology theory is undermined by a tendency of people to be influenced
1 64
by heuristic biases and errors in processing information.
Any deterrence message emanating from tort law is, in reality, often so
opaque and inaccessible that it is largely ineffective. Even if some message were ordinarily communicated by tort liability, it would emanate
from such unpredictable and ill-defined outcomes that it would afford the
public no readily discernible guidance. 165 Moreover, there is no irrefutable evidence that individuals generally respond to economic incentives to
reduce their liability costs, in part because of a lack of information or
feasible avenues to predict and manage accident costs. 1 66 Professor Abel
160.
161.
162.
163.

Shuman, supra note 147, at 165-66.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 153-54.

164. See Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583 (2003); Shuman, supra note 147, at 160-64.
165. See King, supra note 14, at 387.
166. See Abel, supra note 7, at 812-13; Ingber, supra note 33, at 796. Abel comments:
[T]he efficacy of tort liability in encouraging safety rests on several dubious
assumptions about economic rationality and market conditions. Some actors
are not profit maximizers in any simplistic sense ....
Most individuals cause
accidents so rarely they have little incentive to seek information about their
frequency and severity or how to avoid them. Liability is no threat to those
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has written that "although it is theoretically possible (if often difficult) to
calculate the costs of safety precautions, it is theoretically impossible to
'1 67
calculate the benefits of accident avoidance.
Third, even if one were to accept for the sake of argument that the
threat of liability actually inspires greater safety, the deterrent effect of
potential tort liability for economic losses would operate nearly as effectively as, and certainly less chaotically and arbitrarily than, the threat of
liability that included an award of damages for pain and suffering. Furthermore, limiting damages to economic loss would pose less of a danger
of over-deterring and stifling essential technological and industrial
innovation.
Fourth, the potential value and importance of tort-based deterrence is
overestimated and does not outweigh the adverse consequences of attempting to award damages for noneconomic pain and suffering. There
are a host of other potential mechanisms to deter unsafe conduct. Those
include criminal sanctions, 168 safety regulations, 169 and the built-in deterrence that the plaintiff might become injured himself. 170 Any message
from tort liability also suffers from the tendency of human thinking to be
category-bound. 171 In this connection, Cass Sunstein writes:
Our first psychological observation is that in law, as in ordinary life,
people's thinking is category-bound. People do not easily cross the
boundaries of categories of harms in their thinking. When they consider an individual case of physical injury ... the frame of reference
for evaluation is usually a set of instances of the same kind of
harm. . . . They are much less likely to concern themselves with the
consistency of their determinations with punishments for other categories of harmful conduct, such as damage to endangered species.
Yet, as we will show, simultaneous consideration of penalties for different kinds of infractions will often reveal that the more severe punwho are judgment proof. Even profit-seeking enterprises may be able to
transfer liability costs to consumers rather than enhance safety if demand is
relatively inelastic ...,the market is highly oligopostic, [and] accident costs
are an insignificant portion of price.
Abel, supra note 7, at 812-13.
167. Id. at 808 (explaining that "[e]conomists cannot tell us the value of bodily integrity,
emotional well-being, or life because these are not defined by the market").
168. See ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 162. For many drivers, for example, it is hard to
imagine any tort-based deterrence that compares to the threat of loss of one license or
right to operate a motor vehicle. See CANE, supra note 55, at 365.
169. ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 163, 168.
170. Atiyah notes in connection with auto operators that "[i]f all these things don't
deter many people from bad driving it is absurd to think that they will be deterred by the
thought that their insurance companies may have to pay a damages claim." Id. at 162; see
also CANE, supra note 55, at 365. There is also a built-in deterrence for companies: "Quite
apart from the sheer inhumanity or deliberately taking risks with life or limb, most companies will find themselves subject to financial penalties (and the ensuing bad penalties) for
causing such injuries." ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 173.
171. "When people make moral or legal judgments in isolation, they produce a pattern
of outcomes that they would themselves reject, if only they could see that pattern as a
whole. A major reason is that human thinking is category-bound." Cass R. Sunstein et al.,
PredictablyIncoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1153 (2002).
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ishment was assigned
to the misconduct which, in context, appears to
172
be the less serious.
I would take this a step further, and add that people's decisions are not
merely category-bound, but also controversy-bound, tied to the immediate situation.
Even in the framework of a specific injury, multiple activities may have
played a role, 173 and the tort system using a value-oriented process of
selection, must determine which activity or activities should be held liable. 174 Matters are further complicated by the fact that "[m]any torts,
particularly the most serious, are caused by collectivities, both public and
175
private."
The threat of liability, far from promoting safety, may perversely produce unintended consequences. The threat of liability may inspire more
dangerous conduct than the conduct that ostensibly is to be deterred. We
may get instead the phenomena of the do-it-yourselfers who choose even
more dangerous alternatives to an activity that the threat of liability has
made less available. 176 This idea is sometimes denominated the "theory
of the second best," under which high prices or unavailability of products
or services leads consumers to use substitutes that are less safe. 177 The
threat of liability may encourage not true safety, but efforts to avoid getting caught. 178 Or, "by focusing attention on accidents which generate
172. Id. See generally Abel, supra note 7, at 805 ("Large awards for severe pain and
suffering have several additional consequences: they salve the guilt of the unimpaired at
having been spared such torment (the survivor syndrome) and justify the 'temporarily able
bodied' succumbing to the selfish desire to avoid and ignore the disabled (our new 'invisible man').").
173. Describing the Institute of Medicine study as emphasizing "that adverse results
from health care commonly stem from complex, multicausal, systemic interactions, not
from any monocausal individual mistake." O'Connell & Boutros, supra note 146, at 376.
174. Ingber, supra note 33, at 797.
175. Abel, supra note 7, at 792.
176. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 166 (1988); Peter W. Huber, Courting Danger: The Risky Business of Liability
Law, REASON, Apr. 1989, at 20, 24. Huber illustrates this phenomenon with an example
from the products liability context. The threat of strict liability could, for example, induce
ladder manufacturers to stop manufacturing ladders. That, in turn, might leave people
with no choice but to use the more dangerous kitchen chair when they change a light bulb.
Huber, supra, at 24.
177. Mark Geistfeld, Implementing Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson and
Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1157, 1170-71 (1992). "[T]he theory of the second best shows
that if individuals make choices from a set of activities, regulations designed to achieve
efficient behavior with respect to one activity may lead to greater overall inefficiency if
enough people switch from regulated to unregulated activities." Id. at 1170.
178. See Abel, supra note 7, at 814 ("[T]he threat of damages encourages entrepreneurs
to minimize liability, not accident costs. It creates perverse incentives: to conceal information about danger, take actions that maximize success in litigation (such as defensive
medicine), resist legitimate claims (especially those that may establish unfavorable precedents), use economic power to drive down claims, stall, and conclude settlements that limit
publicity."); ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 170 (fearing that the threat of liability will simply
cause everyone to "clam up"). Medicine is a prime example. In his pioneering work on the
problems of error in medicine, Dr. Lucian Leape has written:
Physicians are expected to function without error, an expectation that physicians translate into the need to be infallible ....
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compensation claims, the tort system diverts attention away from the majority of accidents which do not, and so discourages the
formation of sys' 179
tematic and thorough accident prevention strategies.
Fifth, adding potential damages for pain and suffering to the tort liability "threat level" will distort the kind of cost-benefit or reasonableness
analyses on which the deterrence-incentive goal of tort law is presumably
grounded. The integrity of the kind of judgmental process that potential
tort liability is supposed to induce "depends for its soundness on the assumption that accidents have a 'true' or 'real' cost, and that damages represent that true cost.... [and i]f this is not the case then companies who
have to pay damages may be paying too little or too much, and either way
the incentive to invest in the right levels of safety precautions will be
distorted." 180 If decisionmakers, swayed by cognitive deficiencies in information processing, fail to adequately assess economic data and efficiency
criteria,1 8 1 the addition of the abject arbitrariness and unpredictability of
pain and suffering damages,1 82 and the inherent incommensurability
of
183
pain and money, cannot help but confound the process further.
It has been suggested that this need to be infallible creates a strong pressure
to intellectual dishonesty, to cover up mistakes rather than to admit them.
The organization of medical practice, particularly in the hospital, perpetuates
these norms. Errors are rarely admitted or discussed among physicians in
private practice. Physicians typically feel ... that admission of error will lead
to censure or increased surveillance or, worse, that their colleagues will regard them as incompetent or careless. Far better to conceal a mistake or, if
that is impossible, to try to shift the blame to another, even the patient.
[T]he realities of the malpractice threat provide strong incentives against disclosure or investigation of mistakes. ... It is hardly surprising that a physician
might hesitate to reveal an error to either the patient or hospital authorities
or to expose a colleague to similar devastation for a single mistake.
Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851-52 (1994). What is required is
"a culture in which errors and deviations are regarded not as human failures, but as opportunities to improve the system, 'gems,' as they are sometimes called." Id. at 1857.
179. CANE, supra note 55, at 366. Thus, in the medical context, Dr. Leape laments,
"[r]oot causes, the underlying systems failures, are rarely sought." Leape, supra note 178,
at 1855.
180. ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 167.
181. Prentice & Koehler, supra note 164, at 585-86.
182. See Geistfeld, supra note 85, at 786 (observing that the "arbitrariness and resultant
unpredictability of pain-and-suffering awards undermine the deterrence function of the
tort system" and that "it becomes difficult for risk-creating actors to determine whether the
costs of prevention are less than the benefits of accident reduction"); King, supra note 14,
at 387 (stating that the deterrence message of pain and suffering damages reflects "such
unpredictable and ill-defined outcomes that it would afford the public no real guidance"
upon which to base their conduct); O'Connell & Boutros, supra note 146, at 378 (stating
that "arbitrary nonmonetary awards have the effect of undermining deterrence since riskcreating actors who perform cost-benefit analyses find it very difficult to determine
whether the costs of prevention are justified in light of the costs of liability ... that may
arise in the absence of such precautions").
183. See Ingber, supra note 33, at 798-800 (stating that unless the amount of liability
allocated to an activity is appropriate, deterrence and incentives may be distorted, producing a misallocation of resources, and that "[t]o the extent that intangible injuries are truly
nontransferable, imposing liability burdens the defendant with the costs of an injury that
the plaintiff nevertheless must bear," which "may present a danger of excessive avoidance
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Corrective Justice

Some torts scholars have identified a separate goal commonly referred
to as the goal of achieving "corrective justice." Discussions of this goal
sometimes subsume it into one of the other categories identified here,
such as the preservation of the peace, deterrence, or even the "fairness"
goal. I will address it as a discrete goal here to accommodate those theorists who believe it is conceptually distinct from other goals. I will use the
corrective justice terminology here to connote a goal of using tort liability
184
as a vehicle for reestablishing the moral balance between the parties.1 85
Professor Atiyah couches this goal in terms of "public accountability,"'
using the right to assert tort claims as1 86a way of making tortfeasors "publicly accountable for their behavior."'
A number of torts theorists have attempted to use a corrective justice
goal as a justification for the award of noneconomic pain and suffering
damages. Margaret Radin has acknowledged the problem that the incommensurability of pain and money damages poses for noneconomic dam-

and a concomitant misallocation of resources"); Geistfeld, supra note 85, at 786, 788 (stating that "when the tort system imposes liability costs in an unpredictable manner, it becomes difficult for risk-creating actors to determine whether the costs of prevention are
less than the benefits of accident reduction," and that "[t]he arbitrary component of pain
and suffering ...cannot be experience rated" (citing Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee,
Deterrent and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.ECON. & ORGANIZATION 279 (1986)));
O'Connell & Boutros, supra note 146, at 378 (stating that "arbitrary nonmonetary awards
have the effect of undermining deterrence since risk-creating actors who perform costbenefit analyses find it very difficult to determine whether the costs of prevention are justified in light of the costs of liability ...that may arise in the absence of such precautions").
184. See ABRAHAM, supra note 56, at 14 (explaining that "[w]hen one party wrongs
another, correction of the wrong may help to restore the moral balance between them");
CANE, supra note 55, at 359 (stating that "the law aims to restore and redress the balance
of fairness or justice which the defendant has upset by negligence or by creating a risk of
injury"); DOBBS, supra note 27, at 12-13 (stating that "[liability is imposed ... when and
only when it is 'right' to do so," and that tort law is "at least partly based on ideals of
corrective justice, ideals of righting wrongs, or (somewhat relatedly) ideals about accountability or personal responsibility for harm-causing conduct"); John Borgo, Causal Paradigms
in Tort Law, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 419, 419-20 (1979) (defining corrective justice as being
founded "upon the notion that when one man harms another the victim has a moral right
to demand, and the injurer a moral duty to pay him, compensation for the harm"); Fischer
& Jerry, supra note 126, at 866-69 (describing this normative perspective on tort law as one
designed to "nullify losses and gains that arise between individuals when one wrongfully
injures another"); M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the Lenses of CorrectiveJustice and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017, 1025,
1030-39 (1998) (describing corrective justice as characterized by a "strong overlay of moral
obligation, and the annulment of a wrongdoer's unjust enrichment," and as positing the
return of the victims to the status quo ante); Morris, supra note 25, at 478 (explaining that
according to a corrective justice rationale, "[i]f injurers were not liable for the suffering
they cause, the law would not reflect the notion that they are morally responsible for it,"
and that "[s]omething primitive in us seems satisfied when we mark the bounds of a wrongdoer's guilt"); Shuman, supra note 58, at 43 (noting that idea is based on the belief that
"tort sanctions" represent "an appropriate response to a defendant's wrongful conduct").
185. ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 169.
186. Id. In other words, tort liability makes the tortfeasor who has caused pain and
suffering "know that his breach of care has caused harm." FISCHER, supra note 31, at 383.
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ages under the traditional distributive torts goals, 8 7 in which damages
operate restoratively (distributively or by "rectification"1 88 ), serving to
restore the plaintiff to his pre-accident state thereby spreading and allocating the costs of accidents. Thus, with respect to noneconomic consequences of pain and suffering, Radin writes:
Rectification is not possible ("the law cannot restore the injured person to his previous position," nor its equivalent), because the value
to the victim of freedom from pain and suffering, cannot be reduced
to money (the harm is "not in any way analogous" to a loss of
money, and the desirable state, "peace of mind," is not the
equivalent of a sum of money), nor can amounts of suffering be arrayed in a scale ("there is no scale") so that they might be paired in
parallel with amounts on the money scale. 189
Notwithstanding this incommensurability Radin looks to a freestanding
corrective justice goal, not tied to a restorative or rectification function,
as a possible way to justify pain and suffering awards:
I think it most likely that the problem incommensurability poses for
rectification as corrective justice will only be solved by developing an
understanding of corrective justice that does not require
rectification.
In other words, there must be some other way to restore moral balance between the parties than by putting the parties into the status
quo ante, which may be irretrievable, or by putting them into a state
equivalent in value to the status quo ante, which may be unachievable given the fact of incommensarability .... I suggest that compen-

sation can symbolize public respect for rights and public recognition
of the transgressor's fault by requiring something important to be
given up on one side and received on the other, even if there is no
equivalence of value possible. 190
Others also have sought umbrage for pain and suffering damages in a
corrective justice rationale. Professor Steven Smith seems to use a blend
of goals, resting primarily on corrective justice, but with preserving-thepeace and deterrent flavors as well. 1 91 He says that "tort law's dispute
resolution function is vital not merely because it prevents private violence, but more importantly because it reinforces the normative order
upon which society depends. 1' 9 2 He paints a Hogarthian, almost apoca187. Incommensurability may pose a similar problem for the deterrence-incentive goal
if it assumes the traditional deterrence model in which conduct is to be guided by costs and
benefits, and costs are defined exclusively in economic terms. See Radin, supra note 101,
at 58-59.

188. Id. at 70.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 68.
191. See Smith, supra note 55, at 766 ("Tort law's primary function ... is not to compensate, deter, or punish, but rather to resolve disputes arising from perceived breaches of
important social norms, thereby reducing conflict and reaffirming those norms.").
192. Id. at 782; see also Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and
Compensation in the Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 31 (1993) (observing that many subjects of their study did not assess compensation solely on the basis of the
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lyptic, picture of what life in society would supposedly be without the
torts damages to peacefully resolve disputes. 193 He counsels that in cases
involving serious intangible injuries, damages "makes the plaintiff 'whole'
not by restoring the plaintiff to her former condition, but by reestablishing her belief in the reliability of the normative order and thereby allevi'194
ating the sense of injustice which is the basis of the dispute.
Accordingly, he says that "[tiort law should aspire... to a symbolic proportionality between injury and remedy:
the more substantial the injury,
1 95
the more substantial the award."'
There are a number of fallacies with a corrective justice rationale for
pain and suffering damages. First, if corrective justice is effectuated by a
restoration of the pre-accident status quo, it will then flounder on the
rocks of incommensurabilty. Second, if the corrective justice rationale is
distinct from the goals of loss spreading and loss allocation, then it seems
premised on a measure of damages for pain and suffering that is not
driven by the level of the victim's pain-an amorphous standardless notion in its own right-but rather on some even less objectively discernible
conceptual dynamic that in some ill-defined way is supposed to correct
the moral balance. Nor are matters helped by blithely inviting juries to
aspire to "substantial proportionality." As Professor Dobbs has cautioned, even if a function of pain and suffering damages is to symbolically
"assuage the plaintiff's sense of outrage when his bodily security is violated and as a legal symbol of society's commitment to recognize the dignity and bodily security of each individual," 196 that purpose "hardly
commands the unlimited verdicts for pain and suffering we now are accustomed to finding.

' 197

Third, other institutions are better suited than

the torts system to achieve public accountability. 198 In fact, haphazard
tort litigation may actually skew the setting of public agendas and prioritizing public scrutiny. 199 Professor Atiyah calls it "jumping the
nature of the injury, but "rather in terms of setting the balance right between the injurer, if
any, and the victim").
193. Smith comments that injury victims either "would try to satisfy their grievances
through private threats, violence, and vigilante justice" or their passivity: "would have
corrosive consequences." Many important norms would relinquish much of their power
because few or no legal sanctions would follow upon their violation. People would lose the
ability to conduct their lives on the assumption that others would act and respond in predictable, reasonable ways. Unless other institutions were to assume tort law's role, social
disintegration would inevitably ensue. Smith, supra note 55, at 782.
194. Id. at 788.
195. Id. at 788-89 (adding that jury instructions "probably communicate this aspiration
as well as can be expected").
196. 2 DOBBS, supra note 67, at 69.
197.
serving
opaque
198.

Id. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW? 57 (1995) (obthat if corrective justice is presented "as a transactional equality," then it "remains
to the extent that the equality that lies at its heart is unexplained").
ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 72.

199. See generally Sunstein et al., supra note 171, at 1153 ("When people make moral or
legal judgments in isolation, they produce a pattern of outcomes that they would themselves reject, if only they could see that pattern as a whole. A major reason is that human
thinking is category-bound.").
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queue. ' 20 0 Fourth, as previously mentioned, 20 1 the award runs counter to
the usual pre-accident expectations of people. Fifth, in the vast majority
of cases, the ones paying the damages will not be the individuals who
committed the specific tortious conduct that caused the harm, but rather
enterprises and liability insurers. Finally, even the conduct of the individual will usually be unintentional and inadvertent. 20 2 Thus, there often is
little if any genuine fault to correct. That leaves us with merely a sad turn
of fate, the work of "that monster, Fortune, ' 20 3 to blame. Now, what
needs correcting? Certainly, the payment of the victim's economic losses
should be sufficient to rebalance the "moral" scales.
6. Administrative Efficiency
Another concern of the torts system is to implement its goals with an
acceptable level of administrative costs. Judge Calabresi has expressed
this goal in terms of controlling the "tertiary" costs of accidents, meaning
the system transaction costs of deciding questions of liability and damages. 20 4 The aim here is to develop rules of liability that are workable
and efficient to apply. 20 5 This goal also considers ways to assuage

problems of proof and access to evidence.
Awarding damages for pain and suffering may impede and frustrate
administrative efficiency in the torts system in a number of respects. Disparity and variability in awards for pain and suffering undermine the legal
system by exploding its claim of equal justice. 20 6 Unjustified variation
and unpredictability of noneconomic damages may erode the authority
and legitimacy of the torts system.20 7 The unpredictability and variability
200. ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 171.
201. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
202. See Ingber, supra note 33, at 791 ("At least with simple negligence, the demand for
restutitve justice is adequately fulfilled by limiting the tortfeasor's liability to pecuniary
costs.").
203. BOETHIUS, THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY 17 (Richard H. Green trans.,
1962). Fortune might herself have explained (as related through the words of Philosophy
as intermediary):
When nature produced you from your mother's womb, I found you naked
and lacking in everything. I nourished you with my abundant gifts, and being
inclined to favor you (an attitude which you now seem to hold against me), I
endowed you with all the affluence and distinction in my power, Now it
pleases me to withdraw my favor. You should be grateful for the use of
things which belonged to someone else; you have no legitimate cause for
complaint, as though you lost something which was your own. . . .I have
done you no injury, Riches, honors, and all good fortune belong to me ....
[T]hey come with me, and when I go, they go too.
Id. at 19.
204. GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTs: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIs

28 (1991).

205. See generally James A. Henderson, JudicialReliance on Public Policy: An Empirical Analysis of Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1570, 1580-83 (1971).
Henderson identifies several process norms that are important if torts rules are to provide
a coherent guide to decisionmakers. The rules must be comprehensible, encompass verifiable facts, and lend themselves to adjudication. Id.
206. Chase, supra note 36, at 769.
207. Leebron, supra note 82, at 311.
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of pain and suffering damages also make it harder to settle claims,
thereby increasing transaction costs. 20 8 This is because settlements may
be impeded by divergences in the parties' evaluation of the value of their
cases. 20 9 There is more disagreement over evaluating pain and suffering
210
than any other issue except perhaps the question of who was at fault.
21
1
Settlements may also be distorted by the coercive effects
of the inestimable threat of pain and suffering damages. Disagreement among counsel and litigants over the unpredictable amount of pain and suffering can
also contribute to unnecessarily high incidence of full-scale litigation to
resolve claims. 2 12 Furthermore, there is no medical litmus with which to
confidently diagnose or objectively measure pain and suffering. Pain is
readily feigned-"science has not yet discovered the magic elixir for distilling truthfulness from malingering. ' 21 3 Finally, the potential threat of
'21 4
awards of pain and suffering encourage "nuisance claims.
Although estimates tend to vary and may depend on the type of personal injury claims involved, it has been estimated that about two dollars
are needed to confer one dollar of benefits on an injury victim. 215 It thus
appears that only a fraction of the money spent by enterprises to insure
against or pay for liability actually redounds to the benefit of victims.
The torts system is a prodigiously expensive vehicle for redressing accidents. Liability for noneconomic damages for pain and suffering compounds this inefficiency by magnifying these inefficiencies. In a world of
finite resources the money lost in systemic administrative and transaction
costs cannot benefit accident victims. As administrative costs increase,
2 16
the availability and costs of insurance are also adversely impacted.
Judged in terms of administrative efficiency and cost effectiveness, the
torts system does not compare favorably to more efficient systems such as
first party health and disability insurance.
7. Fairness
The goal of fairness is frequently invoked in torts cases, especially in
the context of strict liability. 2 17 This goal depends on the nature of the
values thought to be encompassed within the notion of fairness and varies
with the eyes of the beholder. There has never been a clear understand208. See Chase, supra note 36, at 769; O'Connell & Boutros, supra note 146. at 378

("Unpredictability of nonmonetary damages also makes the prospect of the parties agreeing to a settlement price much more elusive.").
209. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 202; Blumstein et al., supra note 79, at 176.
210. O'CONNELL & SIMON, supra note 40, at 5.

211. Ingber, supra note 33, at 779; Leebron, supra note 82, at 311.
212. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 201-03.
213. Friedland, supra note 92, at 341.
214. O'Connell, supra note 102, at 339.
215. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 440; Conrad, supra note 142, at 292.
216. Blumstein et al., supra note 79, at 176.
217. A survey of judicial reliance on policy norms reported that fairness was one of the
most frequently invoked factors. See Henderson, supra note 205, at 1575.
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ing or agreement on the meaning meant of "fairness. '218 An oft-cited
construct for the fairness rationale is embodied in George Fletcher's paradigm of reciprocity. 2 19 This paradigm examines the relative magnitude
and quality of the risks created by the activities of the defendant and by
those of the victim. In other words, "a victim has a right to recover for
injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in order from
those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant-in short, for
injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks."' 220 This fairness rationale is
commonly explicated, in the strict liability context,2 21 simply as the proposition that, as between two innocent persons, the one who initiates and
benefits from the injurious activity should be liable. 222 Thus, this goal
may include an implicit preference for maintaining the economic status
quo, but whether it should is of course another question. Problems of
proof and access to evidence may also be addressed under the fairness
goal.
The fairness rationale is subject to some serious reservations, even
apart from its sheer lack of intelligible definition. Fletcher's reciprocity
construct, for example, has been criticized as suffering from a misplaced
focus because it is "temporally bound" 223 and advances a "philosophical
theory of desert .. .[with] new risks less deserving than existing (older)
ones. '224 Or, one might question why it is "fair" to compensate victims
of tortious injuries caused by insured or solvent actors, but not victims of
accidents arising from more benign or judgment-proof sources. 225 It is
difficult to justify damages for noneconomic pain and suffering when
many persons who are injured or in poor health are dealt a hand without
218. Id. at 1592 (discussing policies underlying products liability and surmising that the
vagueness of judges' attempts at articulating fairness considerations suggested that, while
the judges may have "grasped the concept of fairness intuitively, [they nevertheless] found
it difficult to explain analytically").
219. See George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,
540-42 (1972). Fletcher apparently views fairness as also encompassing other concerns,
and thus broader and not coterminous with his paradigm of reciprocity. Id. at 541.
220. Id. at 54; see also Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 290 (1987) (referring to the "onesidedness of risk creation").
221. See generally Henderson, supra note 205, at 1575-78 (discussing policies underlying
products liability).
222. See William K. Jones, Strict Liabilityfor Hazardous Enterprise,92 COLUM. L. REV.
1705, 1774 (1992); King, supra note 14, at 359; Leebron, supra note 82, at 271; Lynda J.
Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C.
ENV-rL AFF.L. REV. 579, 593-94 (1993).
223. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1080-82 (1972).
224. Id. at 1081 n.84.
225. Judge, then professor, Keeton called this the "bathtub argument," in which he
questioned why we offer victims of some accidents torts compensation, but not those who
slip and fall in a bathtub (presumably a defect-free bathtub). See Robert E. Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 612-13 (1973); see also ATIYAH,
supra note 56, at 144 (commenting on the British experience, and noting that of the total
number of persons stricken with disability or accidental injury, only about one and a half
percent apparently obtain any damages at all," and asking how is that "tiny group selected
for preferential treatment?").
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tortfeasors or solvent ones; they receive no financial assistance even when
they have suffered income loss and have incurred horrendous medical
expenses. 226 To the extent that limiting damages to economic losses
reduces the total amount of torts payouts, it would concomitantly lessen
this effect. Even when an injured person has a viable tort claim against
an insured or solvent tortfeasor and therefore receives damages for pain
and suffering, there is a pronounced lack of "horizontal equity" because
227
similar injuries produce different damages.
Some writers have identified a practice employed by liability insurers
to consider the economic losses as a benchmark upon which to base their
228
If
settlement postures regarding the amounts for pain and suffering.
that is so, then it suggests that persons suffering similar injuries may receive disparate amounts for pain and suffering based on differences in the
economic losses such as loss of earning capacity. This would tend to favor
male plaintiffs over female plaintiffs to the extent the latter receive less
229
income than their male counterparts.
Another criticism of the torts system in terms of fairness is that the
persons who ultimately pay damages are usually innocent of any real
wrongdoing, often because they are insurers or enterprises and are seldom the individuals whose conduct was responsible for the harm. In
other words, since the punishment in tort law rarely "fits the crime," limiting the liability of innocent parties concomitantly reduces the overall
quantum of systemic unfairness. Limiting damages to economic loss
eliminates those damages most subject to exaggeration and abuse-pain
and suffering damages.
8. Autonomy
The preservation of autonomy is also a goal of tort law. The interests
of potential victims of injuries should not be ignored. At the same time,
the effects of the threat of liability on those who may be potentially liable
for such injuries must also be considered. Thus, Justice Schauer reminds
us:
[T]o the extent that the law intervenes in any area of human activity
and declares that for certain consequences of that activity the actor
shall be held civilly liable ... , both the individual actor and society
as a whole feel the effects of the restraint-a psychological effect in
the form of a lessening of incentive, and an economic effect in the
form of the cost of insurance necessary to enable the activity to
226. See CANE, supra note 55, at 353 (saying that "[i]t is hard to justify compensation
for mental distress and deprivation of pleasure when many people receive little or no compensation even for income loss," although some argue that "it might be thought that physical pain does deserve legal recognition in its own right, at least if it is severe").
227. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
228. O'Connell, supra note 102, at 339.
229. See THOMAS H.
(2001).
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continue. 230
The concern here is that the risks of an activity do not unreasonably inhibit the freedom of action of potential victims, that the threat of liability
does not unreasonably inhibit the freedom of potential defendants to engage in worthwhile activities, and that the choices of consumers are
preserved.
The goal of autonomy is consistent with limiting personal injury torts
damages to economic loss. Liability limited to economic loss affords ample protection against encroachments on their autonomy from an enterprise's introduction of some new danger into the community. This is
particularly so if one approximates a value for optimal compensation by
using an analogy to compulsory insurance for plaintiffs in which we ask
"how much insurance an individual [potential victim] would freely
purchase to cover such an injury."'23 1 If, as has been suggested, "most
people would be unlikely to purchase [first party] insurance for pain and
suffering, '2 32 then damages for non-economic losses cannot be justified
by the autonomy interests of potential victims. In other words, if one
views tort liability as a form of compulsory insurance, the imposition of
liability for pain and suffering may encroach on the autonomy of consumers by compelling them "to buy the pain and suffering 'insurance' if they
buy the goods, because the cost of paying pain and suffering judgments
will be included in the cost. '233 At the same time, limiting personal injury damages to economic losses and removing the primary source of the
unpredictability of personal injury damages will enhance social and economic autonomy and freedom.
9.

Permit Freedom of Enterprise

Another concern related to autonomy, or perhaps a subset of it, is that
liability not take so large a portion of the capital of enterprises that too
little is left to animate a free enterprise system or to allow for competition
in a global economy. This goal recognizes the importance of avoiding
excessive liability in order to leave at least a critical mass of capital and
revenue to promote meaningful entrepreneurial decisionmaking. It is undeniable that tort liability is consuming an ever increasing part of
America's resources and capital. According to recent estimates, the
American torts system costs over $200 billion annually (representing
more than 2 percent of the gross domestic product, and, of course, more
than any other developed nation against which American enterprises are
230. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 524 (Cal. 1963) (en banc)
(Schauer, J.), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
231. Leebron, supra note 82, at 273.
232. Id. at 274.
233. 2 DOBBS, supra note 67, at 399 ("These awards are generally reflected in the prices
paid for goods and services, even if consumers would prefer to pay less and forego the
prospect of receiving pain and suffering damages should he be tortiously injured.").
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expected to compete). 234 If these trends are not reversed (or worse allowed to continue along in their insidious way) 235 there will be no economically viable enterprises left in the United States through which the
true economic costs of accidents can be spread and allocated.
IV.

GLIMPSE AT TORTS WITHOUT DAMAGES FOR PAIN
AND SUFFERING

Perhaps at this point I should rest with the core thesis that pain and
suffering damages should be eliminated because they are incompatible
with the goals of modern tort law. I appreciate, however, that my thesis-calling for the elimination of pain and suffering damages-may at
the very least create uneasiness in some circles.2 36 Therefore, I shall venture somewhat further by offering a preliminary profile of the remedial
contours of tort law without discrete damages for pain and suffering. I
propose a three-pronged approach. First, I am convinced that the corrosive effects noneconomic damages have on the goals of tort law and on
the integrity of the torts system, demand elimination of those damages
from the remedial scheme. At the same time, I think that a number of
adjuvant changes should be considered to accompany the elimination of
pain and suffering damages. Accordingly, and secondly, I propose that
economic damages be enhanced in personal injury cases to provide a
more effective (aggressive) compensation for medical and rehabilitative
costs and to better assuage and manage the plaintiff's pain and enhance
(preserve) the quality of his life. Finally, I suggest that prevailing plaintiffs in personal injury cases be awarded reasonable attorney fees.
A.

ELIMINATE DAMAGES FOR NONECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
PAIN AND SUFFERING

Over the years, there have been a wide assortment of reform proposals
for modifying the measure or process of assessing damages for pain and
234. Jim Copeland, The Tort Tax, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2003, at A16. Supreme Court
Justice O'Connor admonished in a recent speech that "[n]o institution of government can
afford now to ignore the rest of the world," adding that "[t]he importance of globalization
should not be underestimated." Sandra D. O'Connor, Address at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 15, 2002).
235. Recent data indicates that tort costs increased by 14.3%, much more rapidly than
the United States economy even in the best of times. COPELAND, supra note 234, at A16.
236. See REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 208 ("[M]any people feel intuitively uneasy about a proposal that any victim who happened to suffer no pecuniary loss (such as a
retiree who experiences no income losses ... ) receive no legal redress at all for a severe
disability inflicted by someone else's carelessness, even though the disability sharply interferes with the victim's quality of life, simply because the victim would not have opted to
purchase loss insurance against this particular type of harm if it were a purely natural
misfortune."); Jaffe, supra, note 1, at 225 (conceding, that even with the best of arguments
against pain and suffering damages, the unlikelihood that the "courts will forthwith deny
the right of the plaintiff to have these intangibles valued"); Zelermyer, supra note 4, at 28
(noting that to quarrel with the awarding of damages for pain and suffering "would not
only contradict a practice long standing but also would indicate a villainous disposition").
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suffering damages. Some have been enacted. 237 Various proposals have
spanned the gamut. Some have proposed different methodologies to
guide jurors in the assessment of pain and suffering damages.2 38 There
have also been a variety of proposals for placing limits on awards for pain
and suffering. These have taken several forms, including outright ceilings
or "caps" on the total amount of noneconomic damages for pain and suf240
fering 239 and schedules based on various criteria.
237. See generally Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 47, at 60-63 & n.78 (discussing
legislation).
238. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 36, at 777 (suggesting informing jurors of the range of
awards in other cases); Diamond et al., supra note 75, at 321-22 (suggesting guidance to
jurors in the form of "comparables" based on awards rendered in other cases); Geistfeld,
supra note 85, at 842 (suggesting instructing jurors to base their awards on "the amount
that a reasonable person would have accepted as fair compensation for the pain and suffering when confronted by the risk" of injury); Levin, supra note 72, at 303 (suggesting descriptive guidelines rather than hard and fast limits).
239. 2 DOBBS, supra note 67, at 397-98; REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 217-19;
Schwartz and Lorber, supra note 47, at 60-63 & n.78 (discussing legislation); Marcus L.
Plant, Damagesfor Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200, 211 (1958) (proposing a maximum limit on damages for pain and suffering, perhaps to be set at 50% of, presumably the
past, medical expenses proved at trial); Stephen D. Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform,
24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795, 807, 823-25 (1987) (proposing not only a threshold on pain and
suffering damages, but also a ceiling to be adjusted regularly for inflation). Ceilings or
caps on pain and suffering damages have been subject to various criticisms. Thus, some
have noted that "standing alone, [they are] a crude means of controlling the award." 2
DOBBS, supra, note 67, at 397-98. Another criticism is that the cost of this reform would be
born at the high end by the more severely harmed victims. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note
2, at 219; see Geistfeld, supra note 85, at 790. It has also been noted that "a cap does little
to cure the problem of erratic, arbitrary disparity in awards beneath the cap level, awards
rendered by many different juries asked to grapple intuitively with the nearly unanswerable question of how much money would be paid in redress for an inherently non-monetary harm." REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 221.
240. See REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 222 (suggesting a threshold of seriousness
before the awards of any pain and suffering damages, with such damages awarded pursuant
to a scale according to which "the amount to be awarded for lesser injuries would be
prorated downward from the figure that was fixed for the most severe injuries," and
"[e]ventually the scale would terminate at the legal floor for any pain and suffering damages," and "[s]everity would be defined not just with reference to the nature of the injury ... but also the age of the victim"); Geistfeld, supra note 85, at 791-92; O'Connell,
supra note 102, at 350 (suggesting, as part of a set of proposals on damages reform, to
abolish pain and suffering damages for non-serious injuries, and defining "serious injuries"
as those for noneconomic losses of in excess of a specified amount or which result in death,
significant permanent injury, serious permanent disfigurement, or inability to work more
lasting more than 6 months); O'Connell & Boutros, supra note 146, at 424 (outlining in
their "early offer plan," a proviso for those who would not be entitled to much in the way
of economic loss providing that "seriously injured claimants, as rigorously defined under
the statute, must be offered a choice between payment of net economic losses or a lump
sum of, say, $500,000"); Sugarman, supra note 239, at 823 (proposing a threshold under
which no damages could be awarded for pain and suffering unless there was at least six
months of disability, or serious disfigurement or impairment); Zelermyer, supra note 4, at
41 (suggesting a schedule of graduated amounts for pain and suffering "arrived at through
a study of comparative severity"); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in
Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989) (suggesting guidelines
based on results in past cases); see also 2 DOBBS, supra note 67, at 397. An approach with
guidelines derived from past awards has been criticized. See Geistfeld, supra note 85, at
791-92, 836-37 (commenting in connection with schedules for jurors or courts based on
evidence of prior pain and suffering awards for similar cases, that "[i]f the system has been
providing overly arbitrary pain and suffering awards, and if we have no method for deter-
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In general, I find these proposals inadequate or incomplete. The ones
attempting to come up with a new set of instructions for the jury are
bound to fail because they attempt to articulate standards for a state that
is not amenable to monetization-incommensurability. The reforms and
proposals employing various limitations in the forms of ceilings or schedules simply do not go far enough. They shift the bar, but leave in place
some level of noneconomic damages for pain and suffering. In so doing
they not only continue to subvert the goals of tort law, but will often add
a new level of arbitrariness to the process because some claimants will be
excluded and others will have their pain and suffering limited by rules
that may bear little relationship to the particular nature of their suffering.
As my observations about the corrosive effects that noneconomic damages have on the goals of tort law suggest, tinkering with pain and suffering damages at the margin, while continuing to allow them, will only
invite attempts to circumvent limitations, push the envelope, and invent
strategies for obtaining that "more adequate award. '' 24 1 These proposals
really do not solve the problem. I would prefer for the courts to limit
compensatory damages in all personal injury torts cases to economic
losses. Thus, a plaintiff in a personal injury torts case would receive no
damages for the noneconomic effects of pain and suffering, mental distress, loss of enjoyment of life, or any other non-economic (or nonpecuniary) loss. Damages would essentially be limited to recovery for loss of
earning capacity, past and future medical and rehabilitative expenses, and
property damages.
Over the years a number of thoughtful commentators have suggested,
the elimination of pain and suffering damages in varying circumstances.
For example, Fleming James and others have urged that pain and suffering damages be eliminated in strict liability claims. 2 42 James believed that
limiting damages to economic loss was a "necessary rational corollary to
strict liability. '24 3 Other writers, such as Stanley Ingber, have made a
persuasive case for a broader repeal. Thus, Ingber has advocated that
damages for noneconomic losses no longer be awarded for unintentional
personal injuries, or at least when the injuries were not severe. 24 4 And,
mining the appropriate award in the first instance, why should we make prior awards the
cornerstone of future awards," and that in any event there may not be a sufficient number
of prior awards to make it feasible).
241. See Melvin M. Belli, Jr., The Use of Demonstrative Evidence in Achieving "The
More Adequate Award," Address Before the Mississippi State Bar Association (June 2,
1951) at 33-37.
242. See James, supra note 126, at 297; see also Jaffe, supra note 1, at 223; Fleming
James, Jr., Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 582 (1956); King, supra note 14,
at 383-89. See generally VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 9-10, 106-15 (1995). Nolan and Ursin propose that courts consider an
array of approaches to limiting damages in the context of their proposal for expanding
strict products liability and for creating strict business premises liability. NOLAN & URSIN,
supra, at 168.
243. James, supra note 126, at 297.
244. See Ingber, supra note 33, at 784 n.53; Morris, supra note 25, at 477-78. Ingber
hedges to some extent, saying that "damages should be limited to the extent that these
injuries have caused or are anticipated to cause transferable, out-of-pocket expenses," but
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still others, have proposed elimination of pain and suffering damages as
part of a more systemic way of approaching the matter of responding to
245
disability and illness.
My proposal does not fit neatly within any of these, but is sympathetic
with many of their observations about the inherent shortcomings and illogic of noneconomic damages. Unlike some, I advocate the complete
elimination of damages for pain and suffering. I would otherwise retain
for now the contours of the existing system of individualized damages for
redressing economic loss, thus continuing to award damages for medical
expenses and loss of earning capacity. With respect to the noneconomic
consequences of pain and suffering, I propose to end noneconomic damages for all personal injury torts without exception or qualification. If
these damages cannot be justified because they make no sense, I prefer
that we make a clean sweep. Thus, I would eliminate them for both strict
liability and fault-based torts, for both unintentional and intentional injuries, and for both those injures described as severe and those not so severe. It makes no sense to award pain and suffering damages for only
"severe" injuries. As I have discussed, money cannot really redress such
harm. It is like saying that we will only treat melanoma but not dermatitis with an application of peanut butter because melanoma is a severe
skin condition and dermatitis is not. The fact remains that peanut butter
does not really cure or assuage either one.
A charge that such a proposal represents a Philistine's view of the law's
response to suffering 246 ignores the pervasive levels of legally unrequited
suffering in this affluent society that are not addressed by helping with
medical expenses and income loss, let alone pain and suffering. 2 47 It also
ignores the whole range of other legal responses available to control conduct that may cause personal injuries, including the threat of liability for
economic damages, punitive damages, criminal sanctions, regulatory responses, and injunctive relief. It also overlooks the role of market forces.
then qualifies it. Ingber, supra note 33, at 809. Where noneconomic damages beyond pecuniary loss "are perceived as necessary to symbolically demonstrate societal concern for
an injured party. . ., a schedule of damages for severe injuries ... may be developed." Id
at 784 n.53. He also says that "nontransferable damages should be awarded only when the
purpose is to punish the morally blameworthy or encourage primary cost avoidance. As
such, general damages should be available only when restitutive justice and deterrence are
both feasible and desirable." Id. at 809. He thus implies that pain and suffering damages
are suitable when the defendant engaged in intentional or reckless conduct and for "individuals who calculatingly risk injury to others." Id. at 788, 791.
245. See Abel, supra note 7, at 823.
246. Jaffe, supra note 1, at 224 (rejecting the Philistine charge).
247. The vast majority of persons who are felled by accidents or illness never have or
pursue a viable tort remedy. Moreover, victims of whole categories of severe accidental
injuries and occupational diseases are prevented from recovering against their employer
for nondisabling pain and suffering. See 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03[41 (2003) ("There is no place in compensation law
for damages on account of pain and suffering, however dreadful they may be."). See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers' Compensation Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405 (1988) (discussing the nature of the

exclusive remedy rule).
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B.

ENHANCED ECONOMIC DAMAGES

FOR ASSUAGING PAIN

AND LIMITATIONS

While proposing the elimination of traditional pain and suffering damages, I also recommend that economic damages be aggressively awarded
for measures that may truly assuage a victim's pain. Thus, I would allow
damages for compensating for pain and suffering but only to the extent
such damages are reasonably and objectively necessary to relieve the actual pain and suffering of the victim (and of course to the extent that
pain-based disability impairs a victim's earning capacity).
I believe that we should reconsider the basic notion of what it should
mean to make a person suffering from pain "whole." Tort law should no
longer indulge the impossible aim of returning the victim to his or her
pre-accident mental and sensory state. Rather, I think that the victim
should be compensated for past and future economic losses, and those
economic losses should be broadly conceived to include sufficient money
to help make the plaintiff whole and fulfilled in his current condition, or
in other words a whole person today.
Accordingly, compensable medical expenses should include the sums
needed for aggressive pain relief. The patient should also be provided
with reasonable medical appliances and modifications for his home and
transportation necessary to respond to the physical and mental limitations attributable to the tort. 248 Damages would be directed at improving

the victim's quality of life by providing the costs of facilitationof his activities in his post-accident condition. But, I disagree with those who have
suggested that damages include a sum for purchasing surrogate pleasures
or to pay for new activities, all to serve as substitutes for the former
pleasures and satisfactions that the post-accident condition and limitations have now placed out of reach.2 4 9 Damages should include money
needed to provide pain relief and creative comprehensive rehabilitation,
and those rehabilitation services should encompass not merely vocational
and medical dimensions, but also should focus more holistically on relieving the victim of discomfort. My broadened notion of economic damages
to assuage pain and address limitations does not contemplate underwriting the purchase of substitutes,2 50 which would rekindle to whole the in51
tractable problem of incommensurables. 2
The philosophical and psychological implications of the attenuation of
suffering can be debated. Some writers have posited that pain must be a
248. Cf. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 229-30 (although suggesting that pain and
suffering damages be retained, suggests not only that such damages be only paid to victims
of serious injuries, but also "with substantial monetary awards paid to the permanently
disabled who can use the additional funds to adjust to and better enjoy life in their future
disabled state").
249. See supra notes 64-65, 67 and accompanying text.
250. See ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 16 ("Provided that their medical and other needs
are met, and something can be done to let them enjoy their lives to the limits of their
medical condition, still further payments serve no real purpose.").
251. See supra notes 101-02, 127-30, 187-89 and accompanying text.
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part of the human experience if people are to realize their creative potential. This idea is captured in the Greek legend of Philoctetes. 25 2According to legend, the demigod Heracles gave Apollo a bow that
never missed its mark, and he bequeathed it to Philoctetes. 5 3 On his argosy to Troy, Philoctetes was bitten on the foot by a virulent snake, causing a chronic, suppurating wound. 254 From this fateful juncture, Edmund
Wilson draws a fundamental idea of "the conception of superior strength
as inseparable from disability, '' 255 and that "genius and disease, like
strength and mutilation, may be inextricably bound together. '256 Under
one view, then, "[y]ou cannot get Philoctetes the astounding marksman
without Philoctetes the loathsome invalid. '2 57 But, others take a different view, that "art grows out of suffering no more than do all human
'258
activities, successful and unsuccessful.
I don't know whether "it takes a worried man to sing a worried
song. ' 259 But, irrespective of whether the crucible of pain and suffering is
essential for some levels of human fulfillment, I believe that ideally the
decision to experience pain and suffering that is amenable to palliation
should be the potential victim's to make. Accordingly, to the extent that
the pain and suffering caused by actionable conduct is reasonably amenable to medical relief, it should be included in the estimate of economic
damages. Moreover, the response to the victim's pain and suffering
should encompass not only aggressive medical pain management 2 60 and
rehabilitation, but also should include appropriate behavioral-cognitive
therapy. 261 Thus, it should not only encompass "the wherewithal to
purchase the equipment, training, assistance, and services that would al252. See PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC 276 (1993).
253. See EDMUND WILSON, Philoctetes: The Wound and the Bow, in THE WOUND AND
THE Bow: SEVEN STUDIES IN LITERATURE 272, 275 (1947).
254. Id. at 276.
255. Id. at 287.

256. Id. at 289.
257.

KRAMER,

supra note 252, at 276.

258. This view is ascribed to Lionel Trilling by Peter Kramer, and is described by
Kramer:
[Airt grows out of suffering no more than do all human activities, successful
and unsuccessful. Trilling counters the Philoctetes myth with those of Pan,
Dionysius, Apollo, and Hermes, in which art is associated with the antithesis
of neurosis: superabundant energy and power. We might say, in the language
of psychobiology, that there is hyperthymic as well as dysthymic art.
Id.; see LIONEL TRILLING, Art and Neurosis, in THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION: ESSAYS ON
LITERATURE AND SOCIETY 152, 160-80 (1951).
view. See KRAMER, supra note 252, at 276.

Kramer seems to agree with this latter

259. These words are from the lyrics of the famous folk song, Worried Man Blues, popularized in numerous recordings. The author is unknown. See Worried Man Blues, at http:/
/www.csufresno.edu/forlkloretballads/BAF890.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2003). Reportedly, the earliest known recording was in 1929 by the Carter family, and the song was
copyrighted by A.P. Carter. Id.
260. See Abraham & Snyder, supra note 94, at 274, 278-90 (discussing the important
strategies that should be followed in pain management, including assessment for spiritual

and existential distress for dying patients).
261. Id. at 278-90; Manetto & McPherson, supra note 94, at 462, 466 (noting the need
for "behavioral-cognitive therapy," especially in the elderly for pain management).
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low them to lead the best life possible after their tragic injury. '262 It
should also, under an expansive concept of medical and vocational benefits, include "a broad range of psychological and social adjustments to the
new disabled state, the bulk of the expenditures made possible by this
'functional' view of pain and suffering damages would fit quite comfortably under the rehabilitative heading. '263 This more holistic approach to
pain and suffering is consistent with recent trends in "practicing healing
law,"'264 based on "seeing the client as a whole person with diverse
265
needs."
C.

AWARDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES TO THE
PREVAILING PLAINTIFF

Unless modified by statute or subject to some special exception, the
parties in torts cases must pay their own attorneys and are not required to
pay the other party's attorney's fees.266 Plaintiffs in personal injury cases
will often pay their attorney by entering into a contingent fee agreement
pursuant to which the attorney will be paid from a percentage of the
plaintiff's recovery, but will not be paid a fee if the plaintiff does not
recover any damages.2 67 The net effect of this practice is that a plaintiff
who is theoretically fully compensated by a defendant will remain undercompensated because of the amounts to which his attorney will be
268
entitled to receive.
It is often said that one of the practical justifications for pain and suffering damages is based on the tacit assumption that such damages will
augment damages so that plaintiff can pay his attorney with less diminu269
tion of his overall recovery (and especially his economic damages).
REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 210.
263. Id. ("It seems reasonable to assume that after the injury the permanently disabled
victim could make good use of the additional funds to diminish the impact of the injury.").
264. Richard L. Halpert, More Than One Kind of Recovery, A.B.A. J., May 2003, at 58.
265. Id. at 58 ("[T]he client's needs may include physical, emotional, social, financial
and spiritual issues, any of which may affect the client's ability to live successfully."); see
David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Putting Therapeutic Jurisprudenceto Work, A.B.A. J.,
May 2003, at 54. Wexler and Winick explain: "Therapeutic jurisprudence focuses on the
law's impact on emotional life and psychological well-being. It is a multidisciplinary approach that seeks to bring insights from the behavioral sciences-psychology, social work,
criminology and the like-into the law, the lawyer's office and the courtroom." Wexler &
Winick, supra, at 54, 56.
266. See DOBBS, supra note 27, at 38; FISCHER, supra note 31, §§ 330-334.
267. See DOBBS, supra note 27, at 38.
268. Id.
269. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 67, at 399 (stating that pain and suffering damages "serve
an eminently practical and important purpose in providing a fund from which the plaintiff's
attorney's fee can be paid without drawing too heavily on that portion of the award actually needed to pay medical bills or replace lost earnings"); O'CONNELL & SIMON, supra
note 40, at 51 (stating that damages for pain and suffering are "explained in part ... in that
lawyers take their fees from amounts supposedly paid for pain and suffering"); REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 2, at 215 ("[Tlhe crucial practical role that pain and suffering damages play in the current tort regime is generating the funds to pay for the fees charged by
262.

plaintiff's attorney."); Geistfeld, supra note 85, at 801 ("[P]ain-and-suffering damages have

often been justified on the ground that these awards in effect compensate the plaintiff for
her legal expenses.").
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Use of chaotic pain and suffering awards to replace attorney fees is at
best, however, a blunt instrument, 270 and at worst invites chaos and
abuse. I have proposed that noneconomic damages for pain and suffering
be eliminated. If the awarding of attorney fees is believed to be an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's remedial package to assure plaintiffs that
their economic losses are fully redressed, then that can and should be
accomplished directly and openly rather than through a haphazard backdoor approach that relies on pain and suffering damages to replace the
outlay for attorney fees. A number of commentators have recognized the
wisdom of combining a proposal for significant change in the approach to
pain and suffering damages with a concomitant introduction of some provision for the awarding of attorney fees.27 1 As the third part of my overall proposal, I thus suggest that prevailing plaintiffs be awarded
reasonable attorney fees based on the actual hours expended by the attorney or a reasonable fee, whichever is less.
V.

CONCLUSION

The awarding of noneconomic damages for pain and suffering is an
established part of personal injury tort law. Over the years, there have
been numerous proposals to deal with the question of pain and suffering
damages, running the gamut from attempts to rationalize the criteria for
such damages to the creation of limits on such awards. There have also
even been occasional calls for the elimination of such damages in at least
some types of torts claims. I have argued that noneconomic damages for
pain and suffering in personal injury torts claims cannot be justified under
the recognized goals of tort law. Pain and suffering damages are conceptually and operationally incompatible with the policy goals of modern tort
law. I have therefore proposed that noneconomic damages for pain and
suffering no longer be recoverable in any personal injury torts claims.
In this article I began by offering a brief overview of the evolution of
pain and suffering damages. I then sought to identify the recognized
goals of personal injury tort law and explained why I believe these goals
are subverted by the awarding of noneconomic damages for pain and suffering. And, lastly, I proposed the complete elimination of damages for
pain and suffering in personal injury torts cases and suggested (albeit tentatively and very preliminarily) a brief outline of some developments that
I believe should accompany the elimination of pain and suffering
damages.
It has become almost a mantra in personal injury cases that damages
are supposed make the plaintiff whole by replacing the losses attributable
270. Morris, supra note 25, at 477 (describing the use of pain and suffering to compensate plaintiffs for their attorney fees as a "clumsy substitute").
271. See Ingber, supra note 33, at 812 (proposing that the court grant attorney fees to
successful litigants); Jaffe, supra note 1, at 234-35 (suggesting overtly making an allowance
for attorney fees); O'Connell, supra note 102, at 351 (suggesting, as part of a set of proposals on damages reforms, that pain and suffering damages for non-serious injuries be abolished that plaintiffs who prevailed be reimbursed for their attorney fees).
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to the tort by awarding the plaintiff a suitable amount of money damages.
The problem is that damages for noneconomic consequences of an injury-the noneconomic effects of pain and suffering-do not accomplish
that immediate end. They do not and never can return the injured person
to his pre-injury position. The only damages that realistically can be said
to return the plaintiff to his pre-injury state are economic damages that
redress loss of earning capacity and medical expenses. Of these economic
damages, the only ones that can genuinely nullify some of a plaintiff's
pain are economic damages for medical expenses to cover pain management and rehabilitation, and to replace the loss of earning capacity to the
extent that pain has caused vocational disability. But, noneconomic damages for pain and suffering cannot in any meaningful way reverse the
noneconomic effects of pain and suffering. The only question that makes
sense here is not whether damages for pain and suffering make the plaintiff whole-they cannot-but whether such damages are consonant with
the underlying policy goals of tort law.
A number of goals of tort law have been recognized over the years.
The paramount contemporary efficiency based goals of tort law contemplate that the costs of accidents be allocated to the most suitable actors
and enterprises whose activities and products generate them, thereby
spreading the costs of accidents to the consumers of the products and
services. In so doing, both the enterprises and their consumers are informed through pricing and cost structures of the true and relative costs
of accidents. This allocation operates to spread the losses of individuals to
a broad class of consumers of the enterprise's goods and services, or
through liability insurance to a broad class of participants in the insured
activity. Deterrence-incentive-based goals are premised on the assumption that the threat or potential for liability will inspire safer conduct or
more efficient allocation of resources and loss prevention strategies. The
attainment of all of the preceding economic goals hinges on the integrity
and soundness of the process of valuing victims' losses. Loss allocation
and spreading are undermined by the incommensurability of pain and
money. The deterrence-incentive-based goals depend on a rational foundation that individuals and enterprises can summon in making their costbenefit analyses so as to optimize the expenditure of resources on loss
avoidance. Deterrence and incentive goals of tort law are corrupted when
the assessment of damages is arbitrary and lacks any objective referent.
I have recommended that a three-prong approach to pain and suffering
damages be considered. First, I have proposed that compensatory damages no longer be awarded in any person injury tort claims for the
noneconomic consequences of pain and suffering. Second, I have urged
that the scope of economic damages be broadly conceived to assure that
comprehensive medical and rehabilitative strategies are employed to assuage the plaintiff's pain. And finally, I have suggested that the prevailing plaintiffs in personal injury torts claims be awarded reasonable
attorney fees.
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